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 Since World War II, Europe has evolved from the Westphalian international 
system into a consociational, supranational state system opting to trade sovereignty for 
collective economic, political and military security. Intergovernmentalism in the 
European Community has evolved into an economic form of supranationalism with the 
persona change from Community to Union after ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1993. The transition to supranationalism and its governance is a result of the integration 
and interdependence of Europe realized through institution building and the resultant 
evolution of cooperation. After WWII, the United States developed a unipolar hegemony 
toward Europe through the implementation of a number of US-led initiatives — Bretton 
Woods, the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the European 
Recovery Plan, and the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the 
interim, the United States waged a Cold War against the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR), which served to strengthen US resolve to support rising free-market 
democracies and eclipsed the rise of yet another contender for superpower status — the 
European Community (EC). The emerging “super” Westphalian state will prove to be the 
single economic rival to US hegemony in the post-Cold War era. The bipolar struggle 
between the United States and the European Union will play out on the economic 
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Since the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, Europe 
has been on track to achieve a new form of government in the international community of 
nation-states, one of a consociational, supranational-type, accomplished through the 
incremental pooling of portions of state sovereignty. This trend of intergovernmentalism 
and interdependence has created a new form of polity, which threatens the unipolar status 
of the United States in the post-Cold War era.  
The United States realized a decline in hegemony in the international system since 
1973, a fact supported by the decline in the prestige and effectiveness in a number of US-
instituted and led regimes during the interim between 1973 and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union — Bretton Woods, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and Containment 
policy. The Korean and Vietnam Wars, US monetary policy, the Third World Movement, 
and the Middle East Oil Crisis exacerbated the decline of these US-led regimes and 
initiatives.  
As a result of the decline of US prestige in the international community, coupled 
with the proliferation of democracies in the latter half of the 20th century, especially in 
Eastern Europe following the USSR’s collapse, the European Union has developed into 
the second largest economy in the world  — the sole, immediate rival to US economic 
stature in the 21st century. The emerging bipolar, economic struggle is taking place in 
regional markets throughout the world today and the United States is clearly losing the 
battle to the European Union over emerging marketshare. 
The results of this bipolar struggle have great implications for US-Transatlantic 
relations and, more importantly, for US influence within regional security structures 
throughout  the world. US policy towards the European Union must come to terms with 
the emergence of the European Union as a new polity within the international community 
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A.  DESCRIPTION OF THE TOPIC 
 
The evolution of the international system, from the Treaty of Westphalia through 
the collapse of the Communist experiment in Russia in the early 1990s, has made the new 
millennia ripe with promise for economic contenders to US hegemony. The remarkable 
cooperation of European nation-states following World War II has led to the development 
of an economic contender to rival the UnitedStates. 
This research explores the rise of the European Union as a contender for US 
marketshare and political influence in regional markets and suggests implications for 
revising US foreign policy to respond to declining US influence in regional markets.  
Evaluation of the contentiousness of European competition for regional marketshare, 
analysis of the economic threat and its implications for US economic and political 
policies toward regional markets addressed by this thesis  
 
B. IDENTIFICATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This research will focus on the following questions: 
1. How has the evolution of the European community of nation-states posed a 
new threat to US hegemony? 
2. How has the evolution of US domestic and foreign policy contributed to the 
weakening of US hegemony in the post-Cold War era? 
3. Has US-EU economic competition in regional world markets led to the 
development of competition within regional security architectures?  
4. What are the implications for US economic and foreign policy for the post-
Cold War era? 
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Chapter II will focus on Europe within the context of the developing international 
system following the Treaty of Westphalia. Chapter III will explore the transition of 
European states in the post-Imperial era from intergovernmental to supranational 
governance. Chapter IV will describe the integration, institution building and cooperative 
evolution process among the European states, describing the legalization and economic 
cooperative efforts, which led to the political integration of the European communities. 
Chapter V will explain the growing divergence of US-European interests and the 
hegemonic instability theory, which characterizes US-European economic relations. 
Chapter V will also describe the economic resurgence of Europe and its contention for 
marketshare with the United States in regional markets. Chapter VI will describe the 
policy implications for the United States to stave off further entrenchment by the 
European Union and describe counter-measures to promote US economic hegemony into 
















II. PEACE OF WESTPHALIA ¾  BRAVE NEW WORLD 
 
The post-World War II international system is not altogether different than the 
one that preceded it — states continue to struggle for power and interest within an 
evolving international system. One of the epochs of history was the introduction of the 
Westphalian international system in 1648. Although Europe had never been united, and 
its history was one of fragmentation, conflict, and changing administrative boundaries, 
“in the economic sphere, the development of capitalism and industrialization provided the 
necessary resource basis for the modern Westphalian state, while the separation of the 
private sector and the public sector is a feature of Westphalian statehood; there is no such 
separation in earlier forms of state.”1 The Peace of Westphalia sought to separate the 
powers of church and state.  
 
In so doing, it transferred to nation-states the special god- like features of 
church authority. States inherited sovereignty, and with it an unassailable 
position above the law that has since remained the central element of 
international relations.2  
 
After two world wars in the 20th century, the international system transitioned 
from one of imperialism to an era with democracy and globalization as system elements. 
The United States led in the efforts to democratize and liberalize free markets. This goal 
was bolstered by a US-led effort to “contain” the forces of communism in all theaters and 
to support fledgling democracies and free markets wherever they took root and 
flourished.  The post-WWII international order saw the rise of US hegemony, with US 
implementation of international reforms at Bretton Woods in 1944, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, the European Recovery Program 
                                                 
1 Alagappa, Muthiah and Takashi Inoguchi, ed. International Security 
Management and the United Nations, New York: United Nations University Press, 1999, 
p. 27. 
2 Lyons, Gene M. and Michael Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia? State 
Sovereignty and International Intervention, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 
1995, p. 97. 
 4
(ERP) or the Marshall Plan in 1948, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
in 1949. These US-sponsored reforms ensured the US place as the hegemonic 
superpower in the post-WWII era and offered security for a war-ravaged Europe to begin 
healing. In the interim, the United States waged a Cold War with the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), which served to strengthen US resolve to support rising free-
market democracies and eclipsed the rise of yet another contender for superpower 
status ¾ the European Community (EC).3  
Larry Diamond depicts the European Union as the most important community of 
democracies in the history of the world.  
 
Two of the highest strategic priorities for the advance of democracy in the 
world are (1) to expand that union to incorporate the post-communist 
states and (2) to bring about a true common market in the Americas4 
¾ the latter, a competitive goal to US leadership in the western 
hemisphere.  
 
In the space of just forty years, the European Community implemented a body of 
treaties and laws and developed a set of institutions that have altered the political, 
economic and social landscape of Western Europe and redefined the balance of power in 
the world by creating a new economic superpower.5  
 
                                                 
3 Oudenaren, John Van, Uniting Europe: European Integration and the Post-Cold 
War World, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000, p. 10. European 
Economic Community/European Community generally is used to refer to the historical 
development of the Community up to 1993; European Union generally is used to refer to 
these organizations after 1993. 
4 Diamond, Larry, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation, Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1999, p. 275. 
5 McCormick, John, Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction, 
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999, p. xii. 
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The European Union is the world’s biggest economic power, is one of the 
two largest markets in the world, expresses itself ever more forcefully in 
global trade negotiations, and has planted the seeds of a common foreign 
and defense policy. 6 
 
The European Union has emerged as a transnational player at least in the in the 
international economic system, exercising a new form of supranational governance 
achieved through partial sovereignty sharing and complex interdependence. Peter 
Herrmann describes, “The EU as a whole block of institutions can be regarded as a new 
emerging ‘super state’: political power is centralized to an extent that its control is nearly 
impossible.”7 As a supranational competitor to US hegemony in the post-Cold War era, 
the European Union threatens the unipolar order, which the United States currently 
dominates, and the struggle for future dominance will certainly play out on the regional, 
economic battlefields of developed and developing markets alike. 
                                                 
6 McCormick, p. xii. 
7   Herrmann, Peter, European Integration Between Institution Building and Social 
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European ascendancy, territorial states claiming exclusive rights over territory 
within their boundaries and freedom from external interference, “dominated European 
politics and conquered much of the rest of the world.”8 Nevertheless, even during this 
state-centric era, the actual content of sovereignty, declares Stephen Krasner, was 
repeatedly contested and persistently challenged by other institutional forms, and the 
exercise of authority within a given territory, generally regarded as a core attribute of 
sovereign states has been problematic in practice and contested in theory. 9 
An unconventional focus on the state led to the neglect of private sector economic 
actors like multinational/transnational corporations.10 In the post-WWII era, the 
international system evolved under the hegemonic umbrella of the United States, which 
waged a hegemonic, bi-polar war with the Soviet Union. World War II ushered in many 
structural changes, which redefined American interests, but international institutions like 
the European Community ensured the implementation of a new US strategy toward 
Europe.11 Europe began to develop an integrated identity, responding to the rebalancing 
of power in the international system.  
We label the political form that emerged from medieval Europe and that 
was legitimated by the doctrine of sovereignty the ‘Westphalian polity’. 
                                                 
8 Hewson, Martin and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to Global Governance 
Theory, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 197. 
9 Ibid, p. 197. 
10 Ibid, p. 200. 
11 Hoffman, Stanley, et al., After the Cold War: International Institutions and 
State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 
104. 
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History is having its revenge on the Westphalian polity, and there are also 
shocks from a future that is as yet only partially perceived.12 
 
B. WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM AND EUROPEAN NATION-STATES 
 
Due to the Westphalian influence on the international system, sovereign nation-
states have managed their affairs through negotiation and war without answering to any 
higher authority. 13  Following the second world war in less than half a century, war-torn 
Europe began the healing process. The US-sponsored transnational regimes of GATT, the 
International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) began to interact with European subscriber nations to develop 
“transnational microeconomic links.”14 Europeanization drew from economic 
cooperation first with US transnational actors, then through cooperation and 
intergovernmentalism through institutions and treaties. With the introduction of the 
Brussels Treaty in 1948, the transformation of the Westphalian System began its 
evolution in Europe. If one defines nationalism as governmental policies that are 
designed to control, reduce, or eliminate a wide range of foreign influences and 
transnational processes on a society, the Brussels Treaty failed to defend European 
nation-states from the infringement by US hegemony. The “Brussels Treaty of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self Defence,”15 signed on 17 March 
1948, was a more effective response to the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the 
Berlin blockade in 1948, because it entered into force the Brussels Treaty Organization, 
which later became the Western European Union. 16  
                                                 
12 Hewson, p. 203. 
13  Lyons, p. 209. 
14 Hewson, p. 208. 
15   Anstis, Christopher and Alexander Moens, eds. Disconcerted Europe: The 
Search for a New Security Architecture, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 5. 
16 Oudenaren, p. 4. 
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To invoke relief from the US-hold over world economic affairs, the European 
nations sought to develop a transnational regime ¾ the OEEC (Organisation for 
European Economic Co-operation)  ¾ to coordinate transnational and intergovernmental 
monetary exchange. Due to the “perceived shortcomings”17 and the “limited 
intergovernmental cooperation”18 that the OEEC offered subscribing na tion-states, the 
European nation-states founded a new set of organizations and began a process of 
“deeper integration involving the transfer of sovereignty to new ‘supranational 
institutions’”19 — beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
Although the establishment of EURATOM20 and the EEC (European Economic 
Community) followed in 1958, which formed the basis of today’s European Union, 
Britain initially chose not to join these communities and, together with several smaller 
countries that also were wary of supranational integration, formed a much looser 
organization, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), in 1960.21 With the 
fulfillment of the EPU (European Payments Union) mission in 1958 of restoring full 
convertibility of European monies with the dollar, the European Economic Community 
abolished the EPU and the OEEC transformed into the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), with the United States and Canada as founding 
                                                 
17 Ibid, p. 8. 
18 Ibid, p. 29. Intergovernmentalism is an approach to integration in which 
national governments establish institutions and procedures to pursue common interests, 
but in which those governments retain the ultimate authority to pursue an independent 
policy if they desire. 
19 Ibid, p. 8. Supranationalism is an approach to international integration under 
which national governments cede sovereignty over certain matters to transnational 
institutions. 
20 The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) is a regional 
organization established in 1958 to create conditions necessary for the establishment and 
growth of nuclear industries. The United States promoted its establishment to benefit 
sales of US nuclear power reactors and related equipment. fuels and technology in 
Europe. 
 
21 Oudenaren, p. 8. Britain, Portugal, the Scandinavian countries, Austria and 
Switzerland formed the EFTA. Finland became an associate member in 1961. 
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members.22 John Van Oudenaren explains, “The OECD took on a new mission of 
promoting economic and social welfare in all developed countries through analysis of 
policy problems and coordination of economic policies.”23  
 
EC-policy is focused on economics ¾ this is true despite and in 
consideration of all political, social, cultural ¼ implications and it is still 
applicable after Maastricht….But at the same time we find ¾  starting with 
the economic orientation ¾ a permanent widening of processes of 
regulation in all concerns.24 
 
1. Evolution of European Westphalian States in Post-Imperial Era 
 
Beginning with the Brussels Treaty, the European community started a trend 
towards the development of a European Union “through a series of celebrated 
intergovernmental bargains, each of which set the agenda for an intervening period of 
consolidation.”25  Following the 1948 Brussels Treaty, the Council of Europe was the 
first attempt to build a consolidated Europe and to safeguard its political and cultural 
heritage by promoting human rights and democracy. Ten European states formed the 
Council of Europe, striving for “closer unity between the like-minded countries of 
Europe” and calling for “common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal 
and administrative matters.”26 The Council began the inroads to the development of a 
European tradition of intergovernmentalism.  
 
                                                 
22 Ibid, pp. 9, 10. Japan, New Zealand and Austria later joined. 
23 Ibid, p. 10. 
24 Herrmann, p. 14. 
25 Sandholtz, Wayne and Alec Stone Sweet, European Integration and 
Supranational Governance, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 7. 
26 McCormick, p. 65. 
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2. From Intergovernmental to Supranational Governance 
 
In 1952, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and French diplomat Jean 
Monnet initiated a new form of integration, focusing on “practical steps in the economic 
field, the building of permanent institutions, and the harnessing of day-to-day economic 
cooperation to a long-term political vision,”27 and founded an independent, supranational 
coal and steel industry. Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands joined France 
and Germany in this enterprise, focusing on an “upward relocation of authority,”28 
thereby, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) after the Treaty of 
Paris, marking the beginning of a new, supranational European entity. John McCormick 
described, “The founding of the ECSC was a small step in itself, but remarkable in that it 
was the first time that any European government had given up significant powers to a 
supranational organization.”29 The new development assured a long-term constitution of 
a new socially functioning international organization. 30 Following the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957, the founding nations of the already successful ECSC established 
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic 
Community. The European Economic Community strove to eliminate all barriers to the 
free flow of goods, capital, services, and people among its member states.31  
The development of the European Community from its outset continued along “a 
continuum that stretches between two ideal-typical modes of governance: the 
                                                 
27 Lyons, p. 208. 
28 Ibid, p. 208. 
29 McCormick, p. 67. 
30 Herrmann, p. 36. The argument for social- functional rationality builds the case 
for constitutive and constructivistic views. Sovereignty is a constitutive norm, whereby, 
nation-states create a treaty, i.e., the Treaty of Maastricht, which, in turn, constitutes the 
European Union. Constructivism posits that international organizations (IOs), non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), or regimes redefined the interests and identities of 
the subscribing nation-states, which led to the socialization of the nation-states to make 
changes to the international system, i.e., construction of the European Union.   
31 Oudenaren, p. 8. 
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intergovernmental and the supranational.”32  This continuum model best describes the 
application of governance in the European Community. 
 
The continuum measures the movement from intergovernmental to 
supranational governance in three related dimensions: EC rules, EC 
organizations, transnational society ¾ those non-governmental actors who 
engage in intra-EC exchanges ¾ social, economic, political ¾ and 
thereby influence, directly or indirectly, policymaking processes and 
outcomes at the European level.33 
 
In attending to governance, scholars consider government in the functional sense, 
in the capacity to regulate arrangements so that they remain routinized, in the absence of 
centralized authority, or, in the performance of functions normally associated with 
governance, performed without the institutions of government.34 Consequently, 
governance and government are synonymous, and order is viewed as both a precondition 
and consequence of government.35 
European rules are products of intergovernmental treaties and conventions, most 
notably, the Treaty of Rome, 1957; the endorsement of the Stockholm Convention of 
1960; the Single European Act, 1986; and the Maastricht Treaty, 1993. The significance 
of these intergovernmental agreements follows from the supranational structures that 
govern the European Community. Supranationalism follows from neofunctionalist 
integration theory.  
 
Three supranational factors consistently recur in accounts of EC reform: 
pressure from EC institutions, particularly the Parliament and Court; 
lobbying by transnational business interest groups; and the political 
entrepreneurship of the Commission….Together these supranational 
                                                 
32   Sandholtz,  p. 8. 
33   Ibid,  p. 9. 
34 Hewson, p. 189. 
35 Ibid, pp. 189, 190. 
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factors offer an account of reform guided by actors and institutions acting 
‘above’ the nation-state.36  
 
The Commission, the Court of Justice, the Parliament, and even at times the 
Council of Ministers are included among EC supranational organizations.37 These 
institutions draw authority from the cession of sovereignty by the Member States. Stanley 
Hoffman and Robert Keohane contend, “For issues on which sovereignty is pooled, 
authority to make decisions is removed from individual states.”38 Although these 
supranational organizations affect intergovernmental agreements, for the most part, 
“supranational arrangements are influenced by transnational pressure groups,”39 or 
transnational actors ¾ “such as companies working in all EU countries or lobbying 
associations located in Brussels.”40  These groups lobbied governments for more 
cooperation both at home and in Brussels. Intergovernmentalism provides for cooperation 
by nation-state leaders and is compatible with a supranationalism that emphasizes how 
transnational pressure groups affect the interests of nation-state leaders.41   
The functional approach of governance concentrates on the state’s subjectification 
of governance to sovereignty. Martin Hewson and Timothy Sinclair explain, “Order, 
rules, institutions, regimes, law, and regulation become central concepts to explain the 
activity of government.”42 The question of traditional sovereignty, affected by the 
intrusion of the European Union and transnational actors on national leaders and 
                                                 
36 Hoffman, Stanley and Robert O. Keohane, The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991, p. 43. 
37   Sandholtz,  p. 10. 
38 Hoffman, Stanley and Robert O. Keohane, The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, p. 7. 
39   Sandholtz,  p. 87. 
40   Oudenaren, p. 24. 
41   Sandholtz,  p. 87. 
42 Hewson, p. 190. 
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sovereign nation-states, continues to influence the European Union on the 
implementation of EU measures.43  The question posed by Muthiah Alagappa and 
Takashi Inoguchi suggests:  
 
How then, should the consequences for state sovereignty be decided? 
Robert Keohane has suggested the term ‘operational sovereignty’, 
indicating a situation where states choose to limit their substantial, 
operational sovereignty through international agreements. According to 
Keohane, this points to a situation where sovereignty ‘is less a territorially 
defined barrier than a bargaining resource for a politics characterized by 
complex transnational networks’.44  
  
The difficulty for the European Union stems from the acceleration towards more 
binding law and arbitration away from states rights. Gene Lyons and Michael 
Mastanduno contend, “Movement away from the convenience-of-the-states extreme on 
the sovereignty continuum is likely to accelerate in the years ahead. The threshold 
beyond which a reversal is impossible may have already been passed.”45  For more than 
four decades, the European Community maintained an economic “persona,” exercising 
multi- level governance through intergovernmentalism, confederalism, and 
consociationalism to achieve supranationalism. 46 Only in the early 1990s did the 
European Union begin to develop a comprehensive political “persona,” with the signing 
of the Treaty of the European Union in Maastricht. Through the Maastricht Treaty, the 
                                                 
43 Alagappa, p. 31. 
44 Ibid, p. 31. 
45   Lyons, p. 225. 
46 Confederalism is a system of administration in which two or more 
organizational units retain their separate identities but give specified powers to a higher 
authority for reasons of convenience, mutual security, or efficiency. Consociationalism is 
a system proposed for socie ties with deep divisions involving government by a coalition 
that represents the different societal groups. Decisionmaking is delegated to the groups, 
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European Union also adopted a framework for expanding its foreign and security policy, 
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IV. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, INSTITUTION 





Europe was not the same after WWII. “First, on the eve of economic 
rationalization in Western Europe, the region had just emerged from the most destructive 
war in human history,”47 explains George Alexander.  
 
For the first time in three centuries, they had common systems of 
government. As the postwar period progressed, the governments of 
Western Europe all developed as stable market-oriented democracies with 
a relatively high degree of social protection. This combination of common 
values and similar political, economic, and social systems was also an 
important condition for integration. 48  
 
The creation of the ECSC helped to resolve the ancient Franco-German enmity 
through incremental interdependence of their respective economies. Alexander further 
details, “Second, a real pan-European movement ¼ was developed in part to underline 
Europe’s separate identity from the United States.”49 This pan-Europeanism sprang from 
a common aversion to a rising US hegemony and the “real sense of obligation former 
coalition partners had to America could not mask equally strong feelings of envy and fear 
for the future.”50 Third, “nationalism throughout Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
                                                 
47 George, Alexander L., et al, Change in the International System, Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1980, p. 31. 
48 Cooper, p. 13. Some reservations may be expressed regarding Spain and 
Portugal, in this instance. 
49 George, p. 31. 
50 Schulzinger, Robert D., U.S. Diplomacy since 1900, 4th Edition, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 200. 
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was probably at its historical nadir” and, finally, Europe’s “motivation for the common 
market was to decrease dependence upon the United States and to create economic 
institutions that could compete effectively with US enterprises and exports.”51 Europeans 
accepted integration in order to distance themselves from and attain equality with a US 
hegemon. 52  
 
B. INTEGRATION, INSTITUTIONALIZATION, AND LEGALIZATION  
 
Much debate surrounds European integration and its social impacts. Hoffman and 
Keohane emphasize, “European integration is, contrary to some other statements, ‘a 
thread woven into the fabric’ of the European society ¾ at least in the 1990s.”53 
Although European governments drove integration, the United States was a powerful 
force for European integration. 54 Uniquely, US government lawyers helped draft the 
treaty for the European Coal and Steel Community.55 Additionally, through the creation 
of NATO, the United States made both a direct and an indirect contribution to European 
integration ¾ direct, because NATO itself has been a major element in European 
integration, and indirect, because solving the security problem in Europe made the launch 
of the then-EEC possible.56  
Ironically, the United States contributed greatly to its own threatened hegemonic 
stability. The United States, in large part, achieved Europeanization through a series of 
                                                 
51 George, p. 31. 
52 Ibid, pp. 31, 32. 
53 Hoffman, Stanley and Robert O. Keohane, The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, p. 136. 
54 Cooper, Robert, The Post-Cold World: Integration and Disintegration, Journal 
of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 1, January 1999, p. 13. 
55 Ibid, p. 14. 
56 Ibid, p. 14. 
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hegemonic initiatives after WWII beginning in 1944, though interdependence and 
cooperation were the eventual outgrowths of European integration, whose “institutions 
have some of the authority that we associate with institutions of sovereign 
governments.”57 
In response to US initiatives in the aftermath of WWII, the institutions formalized 
by European initiatives were foremost functional. The stretching of traditional 
sovereignty to achieve the supranationalism practiced by the European Union required 
innovative institutions. The Merger Treaty of 1965 combined these separate and 
independent institutions into a single set of institutions. The main institutions then, 
became the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, 
and the European Court of Justice. As the central and most important institution, “the 
Commission can be seen as the ‘executive of the EU-government’ in a far reaching sense. 
So it is here where ‘polities in practise’ are to be found.”58 The European Commission 
began in 1951 as the High Authority of the ECSC and leaned towards being executive in 
nature, with considerable autonomy, acquiring the term supranational because of 
governance style.59  
It is a “coherent executive body composed of over 10,000 professionals that is 
able to take initiatives and whose President plays a role at summit meetings of heads of 
government of industrialized countries.”60 The Commission yields much power, 
inasmuch as it is here that bills are initialized and proposed to the Council of Ministers of 
the European Union. The Council of Ministers is the first and most prominent law 
making institution, although the European Parliament has incrementally enhanced and 
                                                 
57 Hoffman, Stanley and Robert O. Keohane, The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, p. 13. With the creation of the Single Market, 
the Community takes over only those functions the states cannot adequately perform. 
58 Herrmann, p. 70. 
59 Wallace, Helen and William Wallace, Policy-Making in the European Union, 
4th Edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 11. 
60 Hoffman, Stanley and Robert O. Keohane, The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, p. 11. 
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enlarged its role and position over the years. At the levels below Ministerial, hundreds of 
national civil servants have an impact on Community Decisionmaking ¾ a system 
known as Comitology, 61 which lends its credibility to “epistemic authority, or the ability 
to make knowledge claims that are perceived to be legitimate.”62 The hundreds of civil 
servants exercise authority from a position of knowledge about the intricacies of the 
European Union and its member parts ¾ the epitomy of an epistemic community. 
Hoffman and Keohane explain, “The European Council, an institutionalized 
summit meeting of heads of state or government, which supplemented but did not replace 
the Council of Ministers, was established in 1974.”63 The European Council decides to 
accept, change, or reject a bill before enactment. By the time a bill reaches the European 
Council, the result is a synchronized, harmonized piece of legislation that clearly passes 
the necessary parameters for surety in passing. Therefore, normally, the bill’s passing is a 
fait accompli at this point. Following passage of a bill into law, national parliaments “can 
only question and criticize after the event; the decisions can not be reopened.”64  
The European Parliament (EP), which actually consists of 626 members elected 
directly on a basis of proportional representation across the member states, received 
direct elections through treaty amendment in 1978, providing credibility and further 
separation from former member state parliamentarians.65 The separation or, more 
specifically, the “‘democratic deficit’ is the gap between the powers transferred to the 
Community level and the control of the elected Parliament over them, a gap filled by 
national civil servants operating as European experts or as members of regulation and 
                                                 
61 Hoffman, Stanley and Robert O. Keohane, The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, p. 158. 
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management committees, and to some extent by organized lobbies, mainly representing 
business. These civil servants are acquiring a detailed knowledge of the Community, 
which complements their knowledge of their own country’s administration.”66 
These civil servants have contributed greatly to the development of epistemic 
communities, which ensure smoother intergovernmental operation between the 
Community and national governments overall. Through time, the European Parliament 
(EP) has acquired greater power by acquiring the rights to formally assent to agreements 
with third world countries and on matters of enlargement,, to approve the Commision’s 
budget, to approve the Commission’s Presidential choice, and through their right to 
request resignation of the Commission in full, which member’s are nationally elected.67 
The Single European Act (SEA) conferred additional functions and powers to the 
European Parliament, inasmuch as when Commission proposals, reaching the Parliament, 
require further amendments to the common position and forwarding to the Council for 
further markup. When the marked up ammended position, again proposed to the 
Commission, returns to Parliament for a second reading the Parliament has the power to 
accept or reject it. If the Parliament accepts the position and the Commission agrees with 
Parliament’s amendments, the position is finally submitted by the Commission to the 
Council and enacted by the Council, in Pillar One Affairs,68 through qualified majority. 
However, should the Parliament reject the position, the Council can only override 
Parliament’s rejection through a unanimous vote.69 Parliament frequently uses the threat 
of rejection “to get pledges that Parliament’s amendments will be accepted.”70 
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The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been especially important in providing 
for a sense of “solidity and predictability” to the EU process as a whole.71 Helen Wallace 
explains, “The ECJ was established in the first treaty texts; these have been virtually 
unchanged since then, except to cater for the increasing workload and successive 
enlargements of the EU membership.”72 Through the Single European Act in 1986, the 
Court of First Instance was established, which provided “something like a supreme court, 
able to provide an overarching framework of jurisprudence, as well as to deal with 
litigation, both in cases referred via the national courts and in those that are brought  
directly before it.”73 Beginning with a series of cases in the 1960s, European law has 
succeeded in establishing several important principles:  
 
Its supremacy over the law of member states, its direct effect, a doctrine of 
proportionality, and another of non-discrimination. In doing so the ECJ 
has gone further in clarifying the rule and the role of law than had been 
specifically been laid down in the treaties.74  
 
Hoffman contends, “No other international organization enjoys such reliably effective 
supremacy of its law over the laws of member governments, with a recognized Court of 
Justice to adjudicate disputes.”75  
In recent years, the ECJ has taken great steps to legally move the Treaties of 
Rome further along in its evolution. The ECJ has gone further than any other Community 
institution in limiting national autonomy, by asserting the “principles of superiority of 
Community law and of the obligation of member states to implement binding national 
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acts consistent with Community directives.”76 The main goal of the Court of Justice has 
been to constitutionalize the Treaty, to fashion a constitutional framework for a quasi-
federal structure in Europe.77  
There is an undisputed supremacy clause in the Community framework, which 
sprang from the 1960s case of Costa vs. Enel presided over originally by a local 
magistrate in Milan, Italy and involving a shareholder of a nationalized power company 
challenging the legality of nationalizing the electric industry in the face of the European 
Community’s legislation. Although the Italian government claimed the Court of Justice 
had no jurisdiction over Italy’s nationalization law, the court ruled:  
 
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own 
institutions, its own personality ¼ and, more particularly, real powers 
stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the 
states to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign 
rights ¼ and have thus created a body of law which binds both their 
nationals and themselves.78  
 
Additiona lly, Article 189 of the Rome Treaty provides for a category of Community 
norms that do not require nation-states to implement the measures but are binding on the 
states and their citizens as soon as the Community enacts them.79 
In dealing with the fundamental rights of Community citizens, the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States and international treaties for the protection of human 
rights supply the guidelines for the framework of Community law. 80   
 
Under Article 173 of the Treaty, the Court has the power to review the 
legality of acts of the Council and the Commission in actions brought by 
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those institutions, by the member states, and even, albeit within certain 
limited circumstances, by natural and legal persons.81  
 
Private individuals could invoke the ruling in Van Gend en Loos provided for the public, 
if Treaty provisions expressly grant them rights and impose on the member states “an 
obligation so precise and unconditional that it can be fulfilled without the necessity of 
further measures.”82 
The judicious use of the legal foundations present in the Rome treaty [Articles 
113, 235, and 238] provides the EC with a basis for implementing relations with other 
groups.83 The European Union most often subscribes to Article 235 when dealing with 
regional markets, such as the European Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Common Market of the South 
(MERCOSUR), and the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
 
C. EUROPEANIZATION, ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND COMPLEX 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
 
The aftermath of WWII, the collapse of the war-fighting coalition and the 
resulting antagonism between the bureaucratic-market oriented Western world and the 
Communist-centralized economy bloc, and the role the United States played in 
reorganizing the economic and political world order is tantamount to a clear 
understanding of the resulting international system. Post-war Europe was in a weak state 
and European markets were in shambles.  
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The main victors on the Western side sought to establish a more open 
international economic system to replace the prewar order, which had 
been characterized by protectionism, competitive currency devaluations, 
and other policies by which the major powers sought to gain economic and 
political advantage at the expense of their rivals.84   
 
One of the two trends following WWII was the “Americanisation”85 of 
Europe ¾ the other, the marketization of social help, a thoroughly entrenched 
characteristic of European governments.  As a ramp up to the war’s end, the United States 
stepped in and commenced several initiatives to undergird Europe, while ensuring US 
businesses access to European markets. At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, the 
US leadership initiated the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD), eventually known as the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. The 
United States also initiated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, 
under which 23 “signatories pledged to lower barriers to trade through negotiations 
conducted in accordance with the ‘most favored nation (MFN)’ principle.”86   
In 1948, the United States implemented the European Recovery Plan or Marshall 
Plan, designed to rehabilitate all European economies and strengthen US marketshare. 
Herrmann explains, “The original April 1947 State Department proposal for the plan 
made clear that one of its ultimate goals was the creation of a western European 
federation.”87  The Marshall Plan was a source of US leverage and forced liberalization 
and stabilization on participating European governments. The Plan also encouraged their 
implementation of the norms and standards of the Bretton Woods regime.88  
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86   Oudenaren, p. 1. 
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Two trends are clear in Europe: Americanisation, and, paradoxically, due to the 
success of the implementation of Amercanising strategies, a “corporate or co-operative 
model of society.”89 While Americanisation of Europe was a conscious effort on the part 
of the United States to insure American interests, the Europeans also pursued Euro-
centric interests in promoting the cooperative model of European society according to 
Parsonian theory. Parsons and structural functionalism stressed the integration and 
maintenance of given societies over the terms and bases of conflict and contradiction 
within them. 90 Crucial to Parsonian theory was the notion that “societal order requires 
clear and definite integration in the sense, on the one hand, of normative coherence and, 
on the other hand, of societal harmony and coordination.”91 The co-operative model 
became the impetus for the constitution of several European institutions, designed to cope 
with transnational and intergovernmental activities. The United States and the European 
states established the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in April 
1948, which served to reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade, “considered the 
possibility of a free trade area or customs union,”92 and established the European 
Payments Union (EPU).93  The Marshall Plan financed the EPU, which the Europeans 
“intended as a temporary solution to the problem of currency convertibility in Europe ¾ 
a halfway house between the full dollar convertibility mandated in the Bretton Woods 
system and the rigid bilateralism that characterized trade and exchange in the late 
1940s.”94  
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The EPU regime played an important role, in that it was through the EPU that the 
Economic Cooperation Association in Washington deemed that the “OEEC nations 
would formally commit themselves to genuine ‘cooperative behavior’ and eventual 
economic integration.”95 
Additional solutions to economic problems manifested themselves, with US 
support, through regional markets, which “played an important role in reviving European 
economies.”96 Through regional markets, we see the second trend, which followed WWII 
¾  “the orientation on a strict liberal model of society including the ongoing 
marketisation of social help.”97 European citizenship is reduced to the market: Herrmann 
explains, “Inclusion takes place by selling the own labour force and purchasing goods 
respectively services. The idealistic cogito ergo sum, as announced by Descartes 
degenerates to the pseudo-materialistic consumo ergo sum.”98  
 
One major point in this development is that both on the national and 
supranational level the real economic disparities continue to exist while 
just the financial structure is united. Thus we find in fact at least 3 
different modes of societal integration: the more or less unified ‘financial 
market’, the real economic processes which are separated from the 
financial deve lopments and organized according to the national 
competitiveness and the processes of social structuration. 99  
 
Nation-states accomplish real economic processes at the national level and conduct 
transfers of resources to and from the European Union through these processes of social 
structuration. In this way, the European Union attains a state of interconnectedness. 
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George explains that this state of “interconnectedness has certain sources (technology, 
transportation and communication), it can be measured by looking at transactions, and it 
leads to sensitivity and vulnerability where conditions in country A become critically 
influenced by decisions, trends, and events in countries B ¼ X.100 As Cooper defines it 
economically, “interdependence, by joining nationa l markets, erodes the effectiveness of 
[domestic] policies and hence threatens national autonomy in the determination and 
pursuit of economic objectives. Interconnectedness often, but not necessarily, creates 
interdependence.”101 Because of interdependence, individual nations lose the power to 
regulate completely the interactions within a given system. If a nation-state attempts to 
make decisions purely based on short-term national advantage ¾ “increasing national 
autonomy ¾ will result in trade wars, currency instability, decline of investment, 
unemployment, and ultimately recession or depression.”102 Effectively, interdependence 
necessitates cooperation. Hoffman and Keohane contend, “The higher the 
interdependence among European countries, the stronger the propensity to move to 
Community rather than national policy, but this propensity reacts adversely on national 
autonomy”103 and the realization of joint gains.  
 
For Morgenthau, state balancing of joint gains is [a] universal 
characteristic of the diplomacy of cooperation. He attributes this to the 
firmly grounded practice of states to balance power, and argues that given 
such a system, no nation will agree to concede political advantages to 
another nation without the expectation, which may or may not be well 
founded, of receiving proportionate advantages in return. 104  
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As a matter of complex interdependence, European member states seem to favor joint 
decision making as a matter of state interest, perceiving that “there are times when 
rational, self interested calculation leads actors to abandon independent decision making 
in favor of joint decision making.”105 Complex interdependence has fewer consequences 
regarding military issues than economic or ecological issues. It also seems to infringe 
more on advanced industrial states than communist and less developed states.106 As a 
matter of choice, individual members affect cooperative interdependence through the 
harmonization of policy ¾ economic, political, and military. To this end, rather than 
subjugating themselves to a perceived higher legal treatise, the members exercise the 
principle of subsidiarity.107  
 
D.  “GRAND BARGAINS,” AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION 
 
The European Union and its member states are largely enthralled in a two-level 
game. The member states’ leaders are both national and Community level policymakers, 
“both of which have sovereignty, though to different degrees,”108 decisively engaged in 
politics at both levels. The decisions these policymakers pursue are based on the realities 
associated with each policymaker’s bureaucratic position: power and interests. Decisions, 
                                                 
105 Krasner, Stephen D. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables, International Organizations, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring, 1982. 
106 Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World 
Politics in Transition, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977, p. 226. 
107 Hoffman, Stanley and Robert O. Keohane, The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, p. 11.  
108 Ibid, p. 137. 
 30
under these conditions, follow from Mile’s Law ¾ “Where you sit depends upon where 
you stand.”109  
 
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring 
the government to adopt fovorable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central 
decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet 
sovereign. 110  
 
The result of these two-level games has been a series of grand bargains, struck by 
the member states, which have facilitated the grand experiment of the European Union. 
As a base of reference, Hoffman and Keohane believe, “bargains are spurred by actors 
seeking to protect gains achieved by expanding into new sectors.”111 In the case of 
Europe, these bargains were formalized as treaties, which “as a rule ¼ devise systems of 
checks and balances whose main function is to keep under control the powers of the 
organization they set up.”112 The first grand bargain was the Brussels Treaty of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self Defence of 1948, which 
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established the Brussels Treaty Organization, the later-known Western European Union, 
after the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 entered into force, as a response to the 
Czechoslovakian coup and the Berlin Blockade of 1948. This Treaty showed a solidarity 
of the European nation-states and also led to the formation of the Council of Europe in 
1949, which began the tradition of intergovernmentalism. 
The second grand bargain, the Treaty of Paris (1952), established the 
supranational ECSC, a new, supranational polity. The movement from intergovernmental 
to supranational governance took root and the third grand bargain was struck in 1957. 
Unlike standard treaties, “in the case of the Rome Treaty,” two basic shortcomings 
existed: (1) the “fundamental rights of the individuals affected by its application” and (2) 
recognition of “a constitutional right to European citizenship,” was lacking. 113 For this 
reason, there has been much speculation concerning the intention of the writers regarding 
further integration of the EEC beyond Rome. The Treaty of Rome did not formalize a 
goal to provide for deepening as a result of Community integration. Hoffman and 
Keohane emphasize, “Anyhow we have to consider that the necessity of such a deepening 
had been included.”114 The fact that the Community continued its efforts at deepening, 
extending its functions and strengthening its institutions, after 1957 shows there was a 
propensity and a shared goal for growth. 115  
Following the Treaties of Rome, the necessity to pursue a legal framework to 
further solidify the economic gains of the Community became an apparent need. This 
legal framework followed from the formation of institutions. The Treaties of Rome, the 
constitutional framework of the new European Community, established a Council to 
conduct Community decisionmaking on all major source issues, whether budgetary, 
legislative, or treaty making. The decisionmaking practiced by the Council approaches a 
system of cooperative federalism such as that in the United States and the Federal 
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Republic of Germany. 116 Haas likened the supranationalism practiced by the EC as a 
close archetypical federation regarding decision-making, in that “participants refrain from 
unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means of 
compromises upgrading common interests.”117 For the most part, Community authorities 
use directives to harmonize national laws on such matters as “taxes, banking, equality of 
the sexes, protection of the environment, employment contracts, and organization of 
companies.”118 Directives are intended to have the force of law. This system, assisted by 
cooperation, paved the way for further development of the Community. 
In 1960, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) was formed, lending weight to 
the perception that “Europe should be seen as nations that have successfully moved from 
interlinked national economies to an integrated regional economy.”119 With the 
implementation of a new regional market, the Community began to experience the effects 
of “spillover,” which explains the process of Community enlargement versus the 
deepening promulgated by “bargains.” Spillover does not adequately account for major 
decisions such as those that led to the Single Act.120 The Single European Act (SEA), 
ratified in 1987, “called for a genuine internal market by the end of 1992, and sharply 
improved the coherence and speed of EC decision making by providing for qualified 
majority voting on issues concerning the internal market.”121  By 1989, Europe was 
substantially larger in population than the United States and of comparable economic 
size.  
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The Single European Act also provided for limited foreign policy cooperation. 122 SEA 
authorizes the Council to decide on issues pertaining to the internal market by qualified 
majority, thereby, restricting the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, an informal 
agreement that required unanimity on all questions a member deemed important to 
national interest.123 The SEA, therefore, provided more transparency to the voting 
process and provided more leverage to the Commission than they possessed earlier. 
Hoffman contends, “Particularly important were the European Commission (EC), which 
had pooled members’ sovereignty on major economic issues through the Single European 
Act of 1985.”124  
The SEA is by far the most far-reaching bargain struck to date, insomuchas, 
Article 8a of the SEA states, “The internal market shall comprise an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured.”125 This infers that the Union is like a state, without borders to its member 
states. The SEA heralded a promise of continued growth.  
 
The Cecchini report, published in 1988, concluded that implementing the 
Single European Act would provide a substantial one-time boost to 
European output (between 2.5% and 6.5% above what would otherwise 
have been achieved), and subsequent studies have concluded that growth 
rate increases would be significant.126  
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The Single Market program was fueled by European realization that Europe could only 
compete with American and Japanese firms by operating on a continental scale.127  
Arthur Cockfield, Commissioner for the internal market in 1984, wrote in his 
1985 White Paper, “‘The achievement of the single market’ is not the ultimate goal, at 
best it is the precursor’ ¾ to, of course, ‘the ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe’.”128 Cockfield’s plan for the Single Market included proposals for harmonizing 
excise taxes and establishing a low and a high band for value-added tax. Hoffman and 
Keohane describe, “Each band allowed limited flexibility for national VAT rates, within 
the same kinds of constraints that apply to state taxes in the United States.”129 With the 
realization of the SEA, “governments decided to strike a bargain on deregulation, which 
seemed to them to require, were it to be effective, reform of the Decisionmaking 
system.”130 The nations of the EC would realize this reform in the Treaty of the European 
Union.  
A prelude to the final grand bargain was realized when the European Parliament 
called for the Draft Treaty of the European Union, which was published on February 14, 
1984 ¾ a move toward qualified voting and the pooling of sovereignty. 131 The final 
grand bargain was struck at the Maastricht Intergovernmental Conference in 1992. The 
convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty on the political Union greatly affected the 
Community’s political structures, limiting political maneuver space at the national level, 
while creating a political vacuum rather than just a shift between national to 
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supranational political levels.132 As a result European polities, rather than national 
polities are incrementally filling the vacuum. This has led to the development of a the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and, following the Helsinki European 
Council in December 1991, a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP), 
answering to the promises made at Maastricht, dealing with the up-to-then last resort of 
sovereignty of the nations. With the solidification of the Treaty at Maastricht, and its 
successor, the Treaty of Amsterdam, in force since 1999, the European Union moved 
closer to the realization of a new identity ¾ a Super Westphalian state, including also the 
security dimension. 
 
1. Western European Union (WEU) and the Treaty of Brussels 
 
Between 1947 and 1949 a series of dramatic political events took place, which 
included direct threats to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece, Turkey, and also affected 
other Western European countries; most prominently mentioned, the February 1948 coup 
in Czechoslovakia, and the illegal blockade of Berlin which began in April of the same 
year. The signing of the Treaty of 1948 marked the determination of five Western 
European countries ¾ Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom to develop a common defence system and to strengthen the ties between them 
in a manner, which would enable them to resist ideological, political and military threats 
to their security. 133  The Brussels Treaty Organization, which became the Western 
European Union, when in 1954, Germany and Italy acceded to the modified Brussels 
Treaty.134 Since NATO had been granted all aspects of Western European military 
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cooperation, the primary function of the Western European Union was to supervise the 
restricted rearmament of Germany.  
 
The WEU played an important part in 1955 in bringing West Germany 
into NATO on terms that satisfied both the demands of the Germans for 
equality of status and the other European States that a rearmed Germany 
still be subject to some international controls.135  
 
In the meantime, the Western European Union had been stripped of its functions: the 
military function was transferred to NATO, the social function and general political 
function was submerged in the Council of Europe, and, eventually, the economic 
functions were institutionalized in the independent institutions of the European 
Communities. In 1960, the Western European Union also transferred its remaining 
cultural and social activities to the Council of Europe; with there being no intent by the 
European nations to further use the Brussels Treaty as a means for political integration, 
the Western European Union became a more or less dormant institution, functioning only 
to a limited extent in its “main” function of internal arms control. This state of affairs 
existed until 1984, when the Western European Union was revitalized as the “military 
arm” of the European Community. 
 
2. European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) 
 
The Maastricht Treaty envisioned the Western European Union as the future 
military arm of the European Union, although it remained institutionally autonomous 
until recently. A growing concern in the 1990s for the establishment of some system of 
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security and order in Eastern Europe in the face of a disintegrating Soviet Union 
propelled the Union toward a common strategy136 ¾ a European Security and Defense 
Identity (ESDI). In 1999, the European Union voted to absorb almost all of the functions 
of the Western European Union in preparation for making the European Union a 
defensive, peacekeeping military organization as well as a social and economic one. 
The new European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) adopted in Kirchberg in 
May 1994 by the Western European Union poses serious political and military 
implications for both the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). John Bolton testified, 
 
 A true European Security and Defense Identity would mean the end of 
NATO as we know it as a military organization, a fragmentation of trans-
Atlantic political cooperation, and could quite possibly spill over into 
harmful economic conflict.137  
 
He carefully couches this argument as a matter of history contending that many European 
political leaders, while welcoming American support through the Marshall Plan, silently 
objected to the “hegemonistic” role of the United States in the Alliance. It is for this 
reason, Bolton argues, that the EC revitalized the Western European Union to secure an 
independent military capability.   
ESDI and the anticipated results of the European Union’s institutionalization of 
ESDI is the crux of the ongoing debate between the European Union and NATO. This 
new identity has serious ramifications for NATO and the United States in terms of 
international political relations and military strategy.  
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3. Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) 
 
In conjunction with the idea and goal of creating a ESDI, the European Union 
also sought a military “Headline Goal,” proposed in 1998 in a bilateral French-United 
Kingdom Summit in Saint-Malo and later fleshed out in Helsinki in 1999. This goal 
would provide the European Union with “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up 
by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in 
order to respond to international crises.”138  
The proposal to pursue a Common European Security and Defense Policy 
(CESDP), backed by British assertions, shows a major shift in the UK position towards 
NATO in defense issues. Hoffman and Keohane insist, “As a guideline for global policy, 
the ‘special relationship’ with the United States is a sentimental mirage.”139 The 
expression by the European Union of a desire to pursue its own security and defense 
policy is a shift from acceptance of collective defense by NATO as a given and has 
implications beyond the security of Western Europe.  
Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO and former British Secretary of 
State for Defense, expressed concern before a conference concerning the globalization of 
the defense industry, “For years, European leaders have pointed out that Europe is an 
economic giant, but a military pygmy.”140  For this reason, ESDI initiatives are very 
important for enabling the European Union to achieve its [Common] European Security 
and Defense Policy ([C]ESDP). The Western European Union was largely perceived only 
as a “Paper Tiger.” With the EU Headline Goal, real assets will be made available for 
common action. However, the achievement of personnel goals does not directly infer 
success. Although the EU nation-states agreed to underscore the Headline Goal of 60,000 
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troops in November’s Capabilities Commitment Conference (2000), by providing 
national figures for assets, troops, ships, and aircraft, the conference woefully revealed 
great capability gaps. Lord Robertson emphasized, “From strategic lift, to satellite 
communications, to command and control, to radar jamming — these are all capabilities 
the European Union does not have.”141  CESDP has a long way to go. In general defense, 
budgets continue to decrease and European security is not high on the European public’s 
agenda. Effectively, because there is a significant overlap of membership and a 
significant gap in EU capabilities, NATO and the European Union must continue to 
mutually support one another to ensure European security.  
 
4. The New Face of Europe  
 
The dividing line between Western Europe and Eastern Europe is blurred; Europe 
has become a political as well as a geographical reality. 142 Analysts have failed to notice 
that the Community’s “hesitant ventures” into foreign policy matters covered a prolific 
change in East-West relations and Atlantic economic relations, which has forced Europe 
into a state of increasing independence. Wayne Sandholtz predicts, “With the end of the 
Cold War and the gradual reduction of the US presence in Europe, that trend is likely to 
continue.”143  
 According to the Weberian approach, power is understood by the configuration 
of a society based on “‘rational grounds’, ‘traditional grounds’, and ‘charismatic 
grounds’.”144 This figuration of legitimacy is given by its formation of economic, 
political, social, cultural ¼ forces.”145 Although the European Union does not wield 
                                                 
141 Ibid, p. 2. 
142 Hoffman, Stanley and Robert O. Keohane, The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, p. 1. 
143   Sandholtz,  p. 281. 
144 Herrmann, p. 76. 
145 Ibid, p. 76. 
 40
military might, it does rank among the two greatest market economies in the world, 
thereby, facilitating an expression of fungible power through regionalization and 
economic market contention. 
After 1989, a significant number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe are 
seeking accession to the European Union, which raises big questions about the 
Community’s future.146 The European Community “laid down conditions that its would-
be partners had to accept. It did not change its rules or reform its institutions to hasten the 
integration of east European states.”147 Normal protocols would call for international 
collaboration, the effort to regulate asymmetrical interdependence in an attempt to reduce 
uncertainty when there is a multitude of considerations and the simplest strategy for 
reducing uncertainty ¾ autarky ¾ is not practicable.148 To the contrary, the European 
Union is functioning as a single, autarkic, autocratic entity ¾ in much the same way as 
an imperialist nation-state. Indeed, the European Community “deals with the kind of 
economic and social questions, which are at the very core of the modern welfare 
state.”149 The European Union’s policies in the face of enlargement show clearly the 
typical distinction between the Community’s foreign policy and member state’s domestic 
policy has become increasingly difficult to distinguish. 150  
Through a series of grand bargains, the European Union has achieved a socio-
economic, politically-substantial, multilateral, transnational polity from the elements of 
individual member states. Through the evolution of institutionalization, integration and 
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cooperation, Europe has forged a post-Westphalian form of supranational governance. 
There is a critical point, which may have already passed, whereby the density of 
European institutions, economic, and political will can no longer return the component 
nation-states easily back to the anarchic international system from which they emerged. 
Lyons and Mastanduno contend, “The narrow standard of traditional sovereignty forms a 
threshold: once a nation achieves a kind of critical mass, it is catapulted to a transcendent 
status through recognition by other members of the club of sovereign states.”151 It is clear 
that the international system recognizes the economic and political personas of the 
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V. HEGEMONIC INSTABILITY ¾ GROWING 




With the economic collapse of the world economy in the late 1920s and the 
subsequent stagnation and declines experienced as a result of World War II, the United 
States was in a position to take hold of the reins of the international system.  
 
In 1940, Henry Luce, the inventor of Time magazine, proclaimed that 
‘America is already the intellectual, scientific and artistic capital of the 
world’. He assured the public that the world had entered ‘the American 
century’ in which ‘we have that indefinable, unmistakable sign of 
leadership ¾ prestige’.152  
 
The Johnson Act of 1934 prevented the United States from  providing private 
loans to other nations, but Roosevelt told the public in a fireside chat on December 29 
that the United States should become “the great arsenal of democracy.”153 This new 
policy provided for the emergence of the United States as the strongest world economy 
due to Roosevelt’s Cash-and-Carry Policy and exploitation of the war economy. Robert 
Schulzinger points out, “The end of the war saw the United States finally become the 




                                                 
152 Schulzinger, p. 167. 
153 Ibid, p. 173. 
154 Ibid, p. 200. 
 44
B. PAX AMERICANA ¾ EVOLVING US FOREIGN POLICY IN POST-WWII 
ERA 
 
The United States began its assertion to hegemony even before the war’s end. 
Roosevelt recognized that British domination of world politics had passed. What replaced 
British domination was a Pax Americana.  
 
While happy to have the British support American schemes for a new 
world order, Roosevelt carefully avoided any commitment to restore 
Britain to its former position of influence. The British were to recognize 
American superiority, and if they did not, Roosevelt would use any means 
at his disposal to force them to.155 
 
Roosevelt proposed to Churchill a new economic order ending British and other 
colonial trade preferences.156 Schulzinger describes, “The president followed Secretary 
of State Hull’s advice that the way to create American domination of the world’s trade 
after the war was to break the stranglehold of the colonial powers, and he insisted on the 
end to imperial preference.”157 Churchill agreed to include a statement about unfair trade 
relations, but wished to secure the British system intact. In the final public version of the 
Atlantic Charter, postwar free trade became a vaguely worded hope.158 The United States 
pursued three principal objectives regarding Europe: (1) “to maintain a strong European 
defense capacity, led by the United States,” (2) “to encourage a European integration that 
remained open to the rest of the world,” and (3) “to continue global liberalization of trade 
and investment on terms favorable to American interests.”159 It was clear that the “nature 
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of threats has changed. Other economies increasingly are in position to exploit terms of 
trade to impose dominance, to structure and play the international system through 
economic means.”160 The US policy was to ensure that the United States wielded the 
economic might to remain on top of the new international economic order. 
The United States did not quickly assert itself in its new leadership role.161 This 
was in large part due to a transition from traditional US isolationism to engagement. 
George asserts, “Isolationism had been strong in the United States in the 1930s, before 
Pearl Harbor. But once the United States got into the war, US opinion developed strong 
support for the idea that it should not return to an isolationist position.”162 Additionally, 
Roosevelt, the architect of the US strategy to engage the world economically, died in 
1945 and their was a resultant transition of national leadership.  
The task in the postwar period was not insurmountable. The requirement was to 
formalize a foreign policy that would serve US interests at home and abroad. The United 
States would remain engaged with the world to transition from imperialism to free-
market democracies and, subsequently, to develop a new world economic order and a 
new security structure. 
  
Foreign policy that aims at establishing a new international system or 
regime generally has an internal structure, a set of interrelated 
components. These are (1) the design objective of the policy; (2) the 
strategy employed to achieve it; and (3) the tactics utilized in 
implementing the strategy. 163  
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Although Roosevelt’s Grand Strategy called for an accommodation of Soviet security 
needs, the moral legitimation of his overall policy stood in the way. 164 The conditionality 
accompanying Russian access to US capital was beyond Russia to accept. The United 
States was intent on establishing a series of economic regimes, which would squarely fly 
in the face of communist society. George explains, “Strong international economic 
regimes depend on hegemonic power ¼ [and] concentration of power contributes to 
stability.”165 The Soviet Union decided to opt out. 
The United States clearly had the economic means to establish a unipolar 
international economic system after WWII. The task for the United States was to 
continue to subvert the imperialistic notions of the European powers from an easily 
defendable power base. In the post-WWII era, this power base would prove to be a series 
of economic, political, and military regimes ¾ the Bretton Woods regime, the theater of 
the United Nations, the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT or World Trade 
Organization), a policy of “Containment” of communist societies, the European Recovery 
Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the pursuit of the Democratic Peace.  
The design objective of post-WWII policies was to dominate the world economy 
from a position of leadership or hegemony. The hegemonic stability thesis is a theory, 
which equates power as a resource; Power is fungible and can be exerted through 
economic regimes as effectively as through military might.166 “Hegemony is an 
overcoming of the ‘economic-corporative’.”167 According to hegemonic theory, the 
United States would exert its power primarily through economic regimes, in order to 
achieve economic returns and ensure world order.  
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Hegemonic stability ¼ posits that changes in the relative power resources 
available to major states will explain changes in international regimes. 
Specifically, it holds that hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a 
single country, are most conducive to the development of strong 
international regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well 
obeyed.168  
 
Hegemonic powers enforce adherence to international regimes that they favor through 
coercion or positive sanctions, providing benefits to those who cooperate.169 
The strategy employed to achieve domination of the world economy required the 
development of a system of international regimes and organizations that would further 
US interests. The tactics were simply to remain engaged and to provide leadership. The 
United States successfully and proactively managed the role as hegemon until the early 
1970s, thereafter, reacting time and again to each challenge by a would-be hegemonic 
contender one at a time.  
 
1. Bretton Woods, 1944 
 
Postwar planning led to the creation of a monetary and financial system at Bretton 
Woods in New Hampshire in July 1944. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) became 
the key agencies of the newly created system and began operations in late 1945. LeRoy 
Bennett explains, “The United States furnished the leadership for the system and, in 
postwar years, became the world’s central banker.”170 The Soviet Union feared being 
swallowed by a capitalist economy and sent no representatives to Bretton Woods.171 The 
British, however, sent representatives in droves. 
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The British sent a large delegation in which John Maynard Keynes took 
the lead in pressing a plan for a new international currency. Morgenthau 
[US negotiator], for his part, would not go as far as Keynes in creating an 
international source of money, preferring instead that nations bow before 
American economic power and fix their money in terms of the dollar.172  
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created to assure convertibility of 
every nation’s currency into that of every other potential trading partner. The IMF was 
backed with $10 billion capital, half of which came from the United States.173 In return 
for its loans, the IMF could demand changes in a borrower’s economic and trade policies 
¾ “insisting that it balance its budget, allow its citizens to hold foreign currency, permit 
convertibility of its currency into other money, and drop restric tive tariffs.”174 George 
describes, “Governments belonging to the International Monetary Fund were to maintain 
official par values for their currencies, which could be changed only to correct a 
‘fundamental disequilibrium’ and only in consultation with the IMF.”175 In this way, the 
United States ensured that member government’s currencies were tied to the dollar. 
Schulzinger posits, “At a time when the United States alone seemed in a good position to 
export goods, the IMF would help produce a congenial trading environment for American 
enterprise.”176 
The US economy sustained strength throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and mid-1960s, 
but began to subside with the onset of the late 1960s.  
 
As the distribution of tangible resources, especially economic resources, 
becomes more equal, capabilities of the hegemonial power will decline 
¾ it will become less capable of enforcing rules against unwilling 
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participants, and it will have fewer resources with which to entice or bribe 
other states into remaining within the confines of the regime.177  
 
As political economic power became more equally distributed among nation-states during 
the 1960s and early to mid 1970s, US-created and US-centered international economic 
regimes began to decline.178 This is easily discernible with the completion of the 
European Payments Union’s mission in 1958 of fully converting European currencies to 
the dollar, the inception of the European regional market ¾ the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) in 1960, and the transition of the Organization for European 
Economic Co-operation (OEEC) to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). This transition of strict management through US economic 
regimes to fundamental liberalization was primarily a US-led effort. As a matter of 
necessity, the United States turned attention toward domestic issues ¾  the Korean War, 
Cuba and the missile crisis, and Vietnam ¾ all elements of a competing national policy 
of “Containment.” The onset of the 1970s brought with it a downturn in US economic 
strength.  
 
When US monetary policy turned from restriction to ease in 1970, in 
reaction to a recession, huge capital outflows took place. The US decision 
of August 1971 to suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold and 
thus to force a change in the Bretton Woods regime followed.179 
 
2. United Nations, 1945 
 
The concept of the United Nations was certainly rooted in the former League of 
Nations, which had not survived the interim between the two wars, one reason being the 
lack of US membership, and therefore, leadership, and its fundamental inability to 
provide for peace and stability in Europe. As a prelude to WWII’s conclusion, Roosevelt 
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and Churchill issued a “vaguely worded Declaration of the United Nations on January 1 
[1942], and they invited all of the countries fighting the Axis to join the United Nations) 
and pledge themselves to continue until the Axis powers were defeated.”180  
From the outset, the United States was destined to play a big role in establishing 
the security architecture for the postwar era. The post-World War II era began with the 
founding of the United Nations, dedicated ¾ as was the League ¾ to the general 
principle of collective security. As was the case at Bretton Woods, the United States led 
in the meeting that opened on April 24, 1945 in San Francisco ¾ twelve days after 
Roosevelt suffered a fatal stroke.181 But, at the same time, initiating the idea of a 
collective security system, the shadow of confrontation and a divide between wartime 
coalition partners was to be seen: 
 
Barely a week in office, Truman met Soviet foreign minister Molotov in 
the White House and dressed him down for his government’s hostility 
toward non-Communist politicians in liberated Poland. ‘I’ve never been 
talked to that way before in my life’, Molotov complained when the new 
president finished his harangue. ‘Keep your agreements and you won’t be 
talked to that way’, Truman replied.182  
 
This set the stage for the meeting and the bipolarity of the international order that would 
follow from it. 
The US-UN relationship has been tenuous through the years. Initially, the United 
States used the UN to further its policy objectives both at home and abroad. The UN has 
served as a stage for political theatrics with Henry Cabot Lodge, serving as the US 
representative to the UN during the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower 
from 1953 to 1960, demonstrating in the General Assembly in 1960 that the Soviets were 
just as guilty of espionage as the United States with its U-2 spy mission with the 
presentation of a bugged gift by the Soviet-American Friendship Society and with Adlai 
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Stevenson presenting irrefutable proof that the Soviets had staged missiles in Cuba.183 
From the mid-1970s, the US role in the UN has been less than that at inception and much 
is made by third states about the tactics that the United States employs to sustain its 
hegemony.  
Another point of contention is member dues. Although it was initially determined 
that the United States would pay approximately 50% of the UN budget, eventually the 
United States settled on a 25% share.184  The economic strength of each country 
determines outlays; therefore, the United States pays a substantially high price for 
membership. In recent years, the United States has held payment on dues to coerce 
political social, economic, and political outcomes. In the post-Cold War era, the UN, 
along with a plethora of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), has experienced a 
proliferation in humanitarian assistance and intervention missions. Roland Koch 
proposes,  
 
The changes in the political conditions of UN-NGO cross-border 
humanitarian assistance (HA) after the end of the Cold War induced an 
expansion of the humanitarian industry at such a great pace that 
humanitarian UN-NGO missions developed into large-scale poor-relief 
supply structures with oligopolistic and hierarchical tendencies at the cost 
of suppressing pluralistic, locally participating, self-help-oriented service 
NGOs.185  
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This, in large part, is the reason the United States often holds dues ¾  to preclude what 
must be described as waste and inefficiency. 
     Koch stipulates that the end of the Cold War changed the voting behavior of 
the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, which resulted in newfound 
freedoms of the UN. This change resulted in a partnership for legitimizing intervention. 
Many third world UN members expressed concern over sovereignty infringement, even 
in the face of massive human rights violations. Humanitarian Assistance provides a 
positive image of “global responsibility and justice” and has allowed donor governments 
to switch financial aid from developmental aid to humanitarian aid, which is channeled 
through the UN and other NGOs. This boosted the humanitarian industry and brought 
into question the independence of NGOs. It also called into question NGO’s transition to 
long-term development with a self-help emphasis to short-term emergency intervention 
policies. The number of complex humanitarian emergencies also rose markedly since 
1990. The transition from a perceived humanitarian role for the UN to one of profit has 
also brought its legitimacy into question. 
 
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947 
 
GATT is a treaty and the only multilateral instrument that establishes agreed rules 
for international trade.186 Hoffman describes, “GATT is the residual agreement left over 
from the proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) planned in 1943, finally 
negotiated in 1947-1948 but never ratified by the Senate.”187 GATT essentially “codified 
three major principles: (1) liberalization of trade, (2) non-discrimination ¾ the most 
favored nation (MFN) principle, and (3) no unfair encouragement for exports.”188 
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Despite GATT’s early success, the trade regime was already showing signs of stress in 
1967. George emphasizes, “The reciprocity and nondiscrimination provisions of GATT 
were already breaking down.”189 This supports Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic 
instability. 190 To place Gilpin’s argument in context, Gilpin would argue that the 
competitiveness of the European Community with the United States stems from a shift in 
economic power from the United States to the European Union. As the European Union 
has become economically more powerful, it has been able to rend compromises from the 
US-led economic regime ¾ GATT. Over the years, GATT has undergone seven rounds 
of negotiations, the most recent being the much-disputed Uruguay Round from 1986-
1993. Peter Lindert and Thomas Pugel reflect, “Since 1995, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has overseen the global rules of government policy toward 
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international trade….The WTO subsumed and expanded on the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade.”191 
 
4. National Security Memorandum 68 (NSC 68) and “Containment” 
 
George Kennan served four tours of duty in foreign service missions in the Soviet 
Union and was generally regarded as an authority on Russia. During his service as charge 
d’affaires in Moscow, on February 22, 1946, Kennan produced a cable, later called the 
Long Telegram, which laid out the principal issues ¾ the motivating factors behind 
Soviet foreign policy. 192 Kennan depicted a Soviet Union in which existed a “traditional 
and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity,” which fostered a “neurotic view of world 
affairs.”193 Kennan underlined emphatically and in quite alarmist language that the 
United States had to confront a political force committed fanatically to the belief that 
with the United States there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and 
necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life 
be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be 
secure.194 Although Kennan argued the imperativeness of stopping Soviet expansion, he 
conceived of an economic strengthening of American society and subsequent “exporting” 
to other free nations its “positive and constructive” image of the world, stressing the 
obsolescence of war as an effective means in dealing with Soviet power.195 To this end, 
US leadership responded with National Security Memorandum No. 68 (NSC 68), a 
national strategy which melded “two closely interlinked strategies: the first was the 
development of a ‘healthy international community’, which had already been actually in 
                                                 
191 Lindert, p. 139. 
192 Fakiolas, Efstathios T. Kennan’s Long Telegram and NSC-68: A Comparative 
Analysis, East European Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4, January 1998, p. 415. 
193 Ibid, p. 418. 
194 Ibid, p. 419. 
195 Ibid, pp. 420, 422. 
 55
force through the economic activities of the United States throughout the world; the other 
was the containment of the ‘Soviet system’.”196 
NSC 68, the United States’ objectives and programs for national security, which 
was presented to the President on April 14, 1950, was a top-secret proposal that offered 
several courses of action for presidential consideration. “President Truman never 
explicitly approved the recommendations of NSC 68. His sole action was a request to the 
National Security Council for ‘further information on the implications of the 
Conclusions’, as indicated by his letter of 12 April 1950.”197 National Security 
Memorandum No. 68 was drafted following the explosion of a Soviet atomic device and 
the perceived “loss” of China, thereby, becoming the national strategy which 
promulgated the rapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength in the free 
world as a response to a perceived communist threat ¾ the impetus for the Cold War and 
the “polarization of power.”198  
 
What uniquely marked NSC 68 was two-fold: first, the definition of the 
Soviet threat almost exclusively in military terms and, second, the 
perception that the confrontation between US and the Soviet Union was an 
uncompromisingly total, persistent ‘zero-sum’ game.199  
 
A great debate ensued concerning the US national strategy that followed from Kennan’s 
Long Telegram. Kennan had “made no reference to any armament plan,” but, rather, 
seemed to advocate containment “largely by political methods and ideological means.”200 
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NSC 68, on the other hand, supported a sort of “Containment Militarism,” advocating the 
“advancement of the US as a hegemonically dominant global power.”201  
Under its Cold War containment policy, the United States relied heavily on 
aggressive rhetoric and military might to confront a powerful Soviet Union. NSC 68 was 
not the blueprint for the rearmament after the Korean War began, but the document does 
reflect the major policy decisions of the Korean War period.202  
 
On its own merits, NSC 68 could not generate the funds to restore 
American conventional power or revitalize NATO’s military structure,” 
however, “after the outbreak of the Korean War in June [1950], 
¼ Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Army relied on NSC 
68’s arguments to guide its decisions on budget supplements while it was 
still unapproved as a formal policy. 203 
 
The timing of the Korean War lent credibility to NSC 68 and provided the 
impetus to actually fulfill its recommendations.204 The perception by US officials was to 
assume the worst of Soviet intentions, thereby, provoking David Fatua’s view that “North 
Korea’s unprovoked aggression as not just an attack against South Korea, but an attack 
against the fundamental principles of democracy and individual freedom everywhere in 
the ‘Free World’.”205 The defense of these fundamental principles was also the impetus 
for United States intervention in Vietnam.  
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From 1946, the Vietnamese struggled for their independence from France during 
the First Indochina War. At the end of this war, the country was divided into North 
Vietnam, under the control of the Vietnamese Communists, and South Vietnam, which 
had collaborated with the French. The United States intervened in Vietnam because it 
believed that if country fell under a Communist government, Communism would spread 
throughout Southeast Asia and beyond. This belief was known as the “domino theory.” 
The U.S. government, therefore, supported the South Vietnamese government. This 
government's repressive policies led to rebellion in the South, and the National Liberation 
Front (NLF) was formed as an opposition group with close ties to North Vietnam. There 
was an overwhelming sense among American strategists to rely on “representative” 
perceptions of the communist struggle in Vietnam ¾ the temptation to view North 
Vietnam like North Korea. In 1965, the United States, “astride the world like a 
colossus,”206 felt confident enough of its power and position to deploy half a million men 
to prevent the South Vietnamese government from collapsing. Ultimately, however, the 
United States failed to achieve its goal, further exacerbating the US perception of the evil 
intentions of the Soviet Union. In 1975, Vietnam was reunified under Communist 
control; in 1976, it officially became the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
 
5. European Recovery Plan, 1948 
 
The European Recovery Plan, often referred to as the Marshall Plan after George 
Catlett Marshall, General of the Army and Secretary of State from 1947-1950, was 
extremely effective in remaking a war-torn Europe and underpinning the world economic 
order. 
  
The Americans supported a process of European economic integration, 
beginning in 1950 with the Schuman Plan, which created the European 
Coal and Steel Community, and culminating with the Treaty of Rome in 
1957. American encouragement for these organizations was based on both 
economic and security rationales. The United States acquiesced in a less 
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liberal Europe than American leaders would have preferred because it is 
believed that an economically integrated Europe would be better able to 
combat communist subversion and deter Soviet aggression. 207  
 
6. NATO, 1949 
 
NATO found its beginnings in the aftermath of World War II. The United States 
and Canada negotiated the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, following the 1948 
signing of the Brussels Treaty, proposing an organization based on security guarantees 
and mutual commitments between Europe and North America.  
 
These negotiations culminated in the signature of the Treaty of 
Washington in April 1949, bringing into being a common security system 
based on a partnership among these 12 countries. In 1952, Greece and 
Turkey acceded to the Treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany joined 
the Alliance in 1955 and, in 1982, Spain also became a member of 
NATO.208   
 
From the outset, NATO took on all military responsibilities of the “pure” 
European defense treaty, the Brussels Treaty and the organization, the Western Union. 
After the accession of Germany and Italy to the modified Brussels Treaty, NATO 
assumed the primary responsibility for providing for European Defense under US 
leadership and US military strategies. Mirroring the different political and military 
threats, NATO established its core of cooperation with its Integrated Military Structure 
and varying military command structures. Following the events of the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall and the peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe, as well as the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, NATO agreed to a new Strategic Concept to meet the challenges of the 
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new political and military landscape. This included the Partnership for Peace program, to 
cooperate militarily with non-NATO countries; the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) — now reorganized as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) — to 
politically negotiate with all former Warsaw Pact or neutral and non-aligned nation-
states; dialogue with Mediterranean countries; participation in peacekeeping operations 
under UN-auspices; and eventually also NATO-led military operations to stop intra-
regional conflicts and to stabilize nation building processes. Furthermore, with the 
accession of three former Warsaw Pact states, NATO showed its obvious predeliction 
towards a transition from a predominantly aggressive-deterrent defense organization into 
a cooperative security organization following its adoption of the 1999 Strategic Concept. 
Despite the idea of CESDP, NATO still is the central political-military organization of 
and for Europe, and the central transatlantic forum to link US-American and European 
interests. 
 
7. Democratic Peace 
 
Immanuel Kant’s essay on “Eternal Peace” reflects the very nature of the type of 
peace that the international system seeks to evoke among nation-states.  
 
The state of peace among men who live alongside each other is no state of 
nature (status naturalis). Rather it is a state of war, which constantly 
threatens even if it is not actually in progress. Therefore the state of peace 
must be founded; for the mere omission of the threat of war is no security 
of peace, and consequently a neighbor may treat his neighbor as an enemy 
unless he has guaranteed such security to him, which can only happen 
within a state of law. 209  
 
Bruce Russett depicts, “The vision of a peace among democratically governed states has 
long been invoked as part of a larger struc ture of institutions and practices to promote 
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peace among nation-states.”210 The dynamics of peace or the theoretical context for the 
US policy to seek the democratic peace is based on three realities: 
 
(1) Democracies rarely fight each other (an empirical statement), because 
(2) they have other means of resolving conflicts between them and 
therefore do not need to fight each other (a prudential statement), and (3) 
they perceive that democracies should not fight each other (a normative 
statement about princip les of right behavior), which reinforces the 
empirical statement. By this reasoning, the more democracies there are in 
the world, the fewer potential adversaries we and other democracies will 
have and the wider the zone of peace.211  
 
This reasoning leads to a belief that the norm against the use of force between 
democracies and the threat of the use of force has strengthened over time.212 The ideation 
of democracy in the post-WWII era though, became a binding principle along bipolar 
lines. “Democracy was seen more as a binding principle of the Cold War coalition 
against communism than as a force actively promoting peace among democracies.”213 
The striving for the democratic peace, then, was the struggle for the containment of 
communism. Russett explains, “By the 1970s, with the increasing numbers of 
democracies in the international system, the empirical fact of peace among democracies 
became harder to ignore.”214  
 
As Allen Weinstein, the first president for the [National Endowment for 
Democracy] NED, put it: ‘A number of separate strands ¼ converged in 
the 1981-82 period to produce a critical mass of public attention’ on the 
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issue of ‘democracy promotion’ as a component of overall foreign 
policy.215  
 
Robinson contends, “The passage from ‘political development’ of the 1960s to 
‘democracy promotion’ of the 1980s and 1990s involves an expansion from ‘institution 
building’ at the level of formal state structures to the level of both state structures and 
civil society.”216 One of the purposes of our international affairs budget is to “ensure that 
the democratic tide remains a rising tide around the world and, to this end, from Asia to 
the Andes, US agencies are training judges, drafting commercial codes, advancing the 
status of women, bolstering civil society and otherwise helping countries in trans ition 
ascend the nuts and bolts of freedom.”217  
 
8. Hegemonic Struggle 
 
a. Post-WWII to 1970: Hegemonic Entrenchment  
 
Although the United States emerged as the clear hegemonic controller of 
the international system through a series of economic, political, and military regimes, the 
trend has been a digression from a position of power to a position as an equal competitor.  
 
In the period of 1945-47 the European states ran very large balance-of-
payments deficits, which the World Bank and IMF funds proved 
insufficient to meet. For the next decade, the dollar became the standard 
world currency and the United States followed a set of policies that 
provided an outflow of dollars to furnish liquidity for international 
transactions. Through aid programs for European states and military 
expenditures the United States intentionally ran balance-of-payments 
deficits to provide dollars for the international economy.218  
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This policy precluded the United States from establishing itself firmly in 
the postwar period and becoming decisively entrenched in the economic order. “In a 
hegemonic system,” Gramsci suggested, “democracy between the ruling group and the 
ruled group exists to the extent that the development of the economy, and therefore of the 
legislation which expresses that development, holds open the channels for the ruled to 
enter the ruling group.”219 At the outset, European countries were firmly committed to 
submitting to the regimes emplaced by the United States, because the rewards were 
meted out commensurate with participation within the confines of the economic and 
socio-political order. In time, a weakening hegemon would invite contenders. Bennett 
opines, “In the late 1960s, the central banks proved incapable of controlling the large and 
volatile currency flows and resulting speculation. The fixed exchange rate system showed 
increasing signs of stress. In spite of United States pressure, European states refused to 
revalue their currencies.”220 
 The struggle by the United States to maintain the economic order was 
superseded by the policy of containment that held Americans in harms way in both Korea 
and Vietnam. The United States entered the 1970s from a position of economic and 
“perceived” military weakness. George reflects, “The United States had been defeated in 
Vietnam and no longer seemed to have either the capability or inclination to extend its 
military domination to the far corners of the world.”221 
 
b. 1970 to post-Cold War: Hegemonic Instability 
 
Reeling from the backlash of a costly struggle in Vietnam and without 
consulting with the European nations, on August 15, 1971, Nixon announced a 10 percent 
surcharge on imports, greatly exacerbating the looming crisis with his announcement of a 
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New Economic Policy. 222 Attempts at monetary reform ensued. Bennett purports, “In the 
Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971 the price of gold was altered, the dollar was 
devalued by 10 percent, and more flexibility was introduced into exchange rates ¼ By 
1973, fixed exchange rates gave way to floating rates.”223  
The 1970s were a clear turning point, but 1973 was a watershed for loss of 
US hegemony. Following 1972 and disengagement from Vietnam, the perceived failure 
of US military force was also a perceived failure of the policy of containment. Kissinger 
proclaimed 1973 the “Year of Europe to symbolize returning to alliance relationships 
from the preoccupation with the Vietnam War.”224 A British scholar described the Year 
of Europe as “a deliberate attempt to force a tradeoff between trans-Atlantic economic 
and financial relations which the Nixon administration saw as biased in Europe’s 
favor.”225 Both the Middle East Crisis and the subsequent Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) Oil embargo occurred in that watershed year, as well as the 
termination of the gold exchange standard. The result was a deadly blow to US 
hegemony and leadership in the world economy.  
International monetary relations, trade in manufactured goods, and the 
production and sale of petroleum were the key international regimes affecting US decline 
in the1970s.  
 
All three international regimes existing in 1967 became weaker during the 
subsequent decade; this weakening was most pronounced in the petroleum 
area and in monetary relations, where the old norms were destroyed and 
very different practices emerged ¾ it was less sudden and less decisive in 
the field of trade; and in the areas of trade and money, the dominant 
political coalitions supporting the regime remained largely the same.226 
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The general breakdown in GATT legal affairs was largely due to toleration of illegal 
restrictions such as the variable levy of the European Economic Community, EEC 
association agreements, and export subsidies.227 George perceives, “The possibility of an 
alternative hegemony seems to presuppose a social order in which the existing hegemonic 
apparatus is not so powerful and pervasive as to disrupt all organized, collective 
challenges and yet which is sufficiently dependent on that hegemonic apparatus for its 
stability so that an alternative hegemony would pose a serious threat.”228 The weakening 
of the US monetary regimes and the “inability of the United States to prevent or 
counteract the oil price increases of 1973-1974 seemed to symbolize the drastic changes 
that had taken place.”229  
 
As the world uses its reserves of minerals and fuels, the number of 
countries that are nearly self-sufficient in resources diminishes and 
interdependence increases. The use of petroleum as an economic and 
political weapon in the Middle East crisis of 1973-74 is dramatic proof of 
the dependence of ¼ the United States upon this resource.230  
 
OPEC “virtually quadrupled prices without negotiation after the Yom Kippur War of 
October 1973….By 1977 the United States had apparent ly conceded control of the 
regime for oil pricing and production to OPEC, and particularly to its key member, Saudi 
Arabia.”231 As shown in Table 1.1, the petroleum figures are dramatic for the United 
States, which went from a large positive position in 1956 to a very large petroleum deficit 
by 1973.232 
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In 1977 the regime for oil was quite different: its norms had been 
developed by oil-producing governments largely within the framework of 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), with the 
strongest norm being the injunction not to sell oil so far, or so massively, 
below the official OPEC price that the cartel structure would be 
threatened.233 
 
By the end of the century, Lester R. Brown points out that of thirteen basic 
industrial raw materials, the United States will have to import more than half its supply of 
twelve of these and will be nearly self-sufficient in phosphate only.234 The implications 
of Brown’s contention is that the United States is entering a period of economic rivalry 
and contention for natural resources, the results of which will certainly determine our 
economic and political standing in the post-Cold War international system. Henry 
Kissinger stated, “Economic rivalry, if carried on without restraint, will in the end 
damage other relationships.”235  
Rivalry will also determine who is able to control or exploit the 
hegemonic regimes. These regimes become influential arenas for gaining advantage.  
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Petroleum Resources:    
US imports and excessive production capacity in three crisis years. 
    
Year Net US Position 
  
US Oil Imports as 





Percent of Oil 
Consumption    
1956 11 25 14 
1967 19 25 6 
1973 35 10 -25 
Source: Joel Darmstadter and Hans H. Landsberg, The Economic 
Background, in Raymond Vernon, ed., The Oil Crisis, special issue of 
Daedalus, Fall, 1975. Pp. 30-31. 
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As arenas for exercising influence, both NATO and GATT were central to 
American strategy. Indeed, GATT was used to constrain European 
Community bargaining tactics in trade, and NATO was used to set limits 
on French tactics of developing the Western European Union in 
defense.236  
 
Many EC policies conflict with GATT aims, including the protection of farmers through 
a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and an external trading preference system with 
developing nations.237 “Between September 1986 and September 1987, the number of 
nontariff restrictions identified by GATT rose from 93 to 135 allegedly affecting half of 
all world trade. The United States and European Union were largely responsible for the 
rise.”238 In the mid-1980s, there was a “growing conviction that Europe can reestablish 
itself as a leading global player, building capacity for independent action while 
minimizing perceived vulnerability and dependence on the choices of those in other 
regions.”239 NATO provided a security blanket for Europe to develop economically and 
politically. Today, the European Union is the United States’ principal rival in the New 
International Economic Order. 
 
c. Post-Cold War: Assessment of US Hegemony 
 
Based on hegemonic theory, the decline of hegemonic structures of power 
will presage a decline in the strength of corresponding international economic regimes.240 
This was the reality into which the United States stepped in the last decade of the 
twentieth century. Although the United States created the Bretton Woods regime, its 
impetus was largely spent by the early 1970s. The United Nations followed the US lead 
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from inception through the mid-1960s, when cooperation yielded to the rise of third 
country coalitions. In 1995, GATT, the outgrowth of the failed 1950 International Trade 
Organization (ITO), became the WTO and its offices located in Geneva. By 1973, the US 
policy of containment was viewed by the world community as flawed, if not failed, due 
to the failure to achieve victory outright in both Korea and Vietnam. After the August 
coup in 1991, which ultimately ousted Gorbachev and led to the dissolution of the Soviet 
regime, NATO adopted a policy of dialogue and cooperation, thus, perpetuating and 
transitioning the alliance in a new direction. NATO, founded the Partnership for Peace in 
1994, a forum to strengthen relations between NATO and the Central and Eastern 
European countries, as well as neutral and non-aligned nations. With the adoption of the 
CESDP, the future role of NATO in Europe is decidedly contentious.  Several US policy 
extensions ¾ the Bretton Woods regime, the UN, and Containment policy ¾ failed, or 
are failing, to achieve intended outcomes ¾  preservation of US hegemony.  
GATT, NATO, the ERP, and the Democratic Peace initiative have served 
the United States in cross-purposes. GATT successfully reinflated the economies of the 
world, providing markets for American industry and, in the process, bringing the 
European economies equilaterally on par with the US economy. NATO provided the 
security requirements for the revamping of European socio-economics, also facilitating 
the rise of the economic contender in the world market. Although the United States 
reaped much benefit from ERP and the Democratic Peace initiative, the Europeans have 
as well.  
 
The ERP officially ended on December 30, 1951 ¾  some forty-five 
months after it had been launched. During that period, nearly $12.4 
billion, mostly in the form of grants, had been allotted by the EPU to the 
participating countries. This amount represented approximately 1.2 
percent of total US Gross National Product (GNP) for the calendar years 
1948-1951.241  
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The success of the ERP is seen in the impressive growth of Europe’s GNP. 
Freedomhouse reported, “Western Europe’s combined GNP rose from $119.6 billion in 
1947 to almost $159 billion in 1951 an overall increase of 32.5 percent.”242 The 
proliferation of democracies since the mid-1970s suggests that ours is the “democratic 
age.”243 The dubious assessment accompanying the proliferation of new democracies is 
based on US policy, which supports West European integration of emerging democracies 
in central and Eastern Europe, as well as Central Asia and the Baltics. It is through this 
methodology that the United States contributes paradoxically to a world of democracies 
and a world of economic competition ¾ the gauntlet, largely taken up by the European 
Union. 
Given the period following the Cold War, the words of George Kennan 
ring ironic: William Robinson described, “We have 50 percent of the world’s wealth, but 
only 6.3 percent of its population…In this situation we cannot fail to be the object of 
envy and resentment.”244 Robinson expressed that the response is even moreso: “Our real 
task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will allow us to 
maintain this position of disparity,” said  the then-Director of Policy Planning of the 
Department of State.245 
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C. POST-COLD WAR EUROPE ¾ NEW US HEGEMONIC COMPETITOR 
 
In the post-Cold War era, a de-emphasis of military competition supposes the 
likelihood that the evolution of economic relations among the great powers will more 
powerfully influence the character of the international system. 246 In this era, the United 
States is still an influential actor with its military and economic strength, but it is no 
longer as economically dominant.247  
 
The end of the Cold War ?did not take place in a fragmented, balance-of-
power Europe, but in a political space increasingly dominated by a single 
organization, so that even rivalry and competition among the members are 
shaped by and channeled through the common rules and institutions.248  
 
The European Community has been successful in forging a strong security community, 
“a concept made prominent by Karl Deutsch nearly forty years ago: ‘security 
communities’.”249 C. Cooper insists, “An economically stronger and more self-confident 
Western Europe is forging a collective identity and is becoming a more equal interlocutor 
for the United States.”250 
Europe’s new identity, stemming from the changes in Maastricht and the adoption 
of a Common European Security and Defense Policy, will make for a more independent 
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strategic partner for the United States. Hoffman asserts, “Since pursuing a joint foreign 
economic policy, the European Community has become a much more difficult 
negotiating partner for the United States.”251 Lawrence Eagleburger explained that the 
next decade in our relationship with Europe will be a transitional period in which the 
patterns of the postwar era undergo significant adjustment in the face of change in the 
East and the political and economic growth of Western Europe itself. US relations with 
Europe will become more complicated as Europeans formulate their own responses to 
Soviet initiatives, seek a more coherent political and economic identity, and generally 
adopt more assertive postures in dealing with the United States.252 
 
1. Politics in a Bi-Polar World and the Rebalance of Power 
 
Although the bipolarity experienced between the United States and the former 
Soviet Union is a past phenomena, the rising contention to US hegemony in the post-
Cold War era will resemble the bipolarity in one context  ¾ nations will choose sides. In 
a complex interdependent world, the lines formed will not be as clear and distinct as 
those distinctions drawn by military threat, rather, the lines drawn by economic 
enticement to regional markets will shape the New International Economic Order. 
“Military bipolarity meant that Europe needed American protection, and that the United 
States needed European support to reinforce its power position,” explains Hoffman. 253 
The Cold War reflected the common security interests of NATO and the economic 
regimes of the west.254 Furthermore, Hoffman contends, “The collapse of the Soviet 
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empire in August 1989 posed three new challenges to¼American objectives: German 
unification, the collapse of communist governments in Eastern Europe, and a diminished 
Soviet threat.”255 
These new challenges were also assumed forgone conclusions. German 
unification and the dissolution of communist government and Soviet threat were certain 
to be a fait accompli. “The collapse of each assumption created a major issue in 
American policy toward Europe. As these assumptions changed, new implications for 
economic relations between Europe and the United States emerged.”256  
 
With the collapse of the Soviet superpower, bipolarity under any 
meaningful definition had collapsed as well. The United States was 
militarily preeminent. However, in the World political 
economy¼Europe¼had become more important.257  
 
While maintaining its commitment to Europe after the Cold War, the United States was 
still concerned about the “relationship between the regional economic institutions, global 
economic regimes, and specific American economic interests to a greater degree than it 
had been in the early days of the Cold War.”258  
 
In an anarchic world of sovereign states, absent international institutions, 
the United States would presumably balance against Europe in the world 
political economy, as Europe would balance against the United States in 
the security realm.259 
 
Presumably, in the post-Cold War era, international politics will increasingly rely 
on economic interdependence in Europe, where Community authority  predominates 
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association agreements, applications for membership, deals with the EFTA countries, and 
bargains in GATT and the OECD. 260 In the past, the United States has relegated its 
leadership role to Europe through NATO, because it does not have membership in the 
key political institution of the EU member-states.261 If the United States does not begin to 
perceive its dealings with Europe in terms of economic interest and economic power, the 
rapid growth of EU influence in regional markets may eclipse US marketshare. Sandholtz 
posits, “There could be broad cooperation among the three centers of industrial power 
[US, Europe, Japan] or dangerous competition that degenerates into security 
confrontation.”262 The impact of security confrontations will be most felt in the security 
communities of regional markets. 
  
Pluralistic security communities may be a radically new form of regional 
governance, far more complex than historical counterparts. Its chances of 
survival, institutionalization, and expansion, however, may be enhanced 
by the fact that this type of governance system lies between, on the one 
hand, the anarchical arrangement of sovereign states ¾ and national 
identities, and, on the other, a system of rule endowed with strong norms, 
institutions, transnational civic traditions, and trust ¾ and transnational 
identities.263 
 
The connections between economics and security imply that higher levels of 
interdependence preclude the use of force in a  liberal economic environment among 
states.264 Because security communities in regional economic markets may prove to be 
the battlefields of the post-Cold War era, it is imperative that US policy reach into both 
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security community and economic market alike to establish influence and cultivate 




The latter-half of the 20th century has seen a movement away from a state-
centered worldview to one of financial disintermiediation. 265 It has challenged our 
understanding of how non-state entities help to shape the economic order and, 
consequently, the security dimension of world society. For this reason, globalization has 
particularly come to the forefront as an explanation of the shift toward disintermediation.  
 
We tend to understand globalization as the outcome of a linear pattern of 
progress, largely determined by economic forces. As technological 
evolution makes possible (and requires) economies of scale, human 
communities are expected to form increasingly large political entities.266  
 
According to this interpretation of globalization, the trend of nation-state interaction is 
becoming increasingly apolitical. 267 Increasingly open trade is doubtlessly beneficial to 
all advanced countries. For this reason, there will certainly be a struggle between great 
economies to redefine the economic order. The emerging economic order will likely 
occur along one of three lines: First, there may develop a trend toward Managed 
Multilateralism — relative shifts in the position among powers, however, the significance 
of relative gains would continue to be submerged within a set of broadly shared goals and 
interests in the world economy. Second, there may erupt a trend toward Regional 
Autonomy — the development of autonomous trading regions with relatively low levels 
of interdependence, separate markets, and extensive trade protectionism. Third, there may 
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develop a trend toward Regional Rivalry, in which, the drive for autarky is fueled by 
worries about relative position and competing state power.268 
Regional Autonomy is also termed Defensive Protectionism. The emerging 
economic order will not likely take this route, because regional trade groups can not 
afford to exclude the greater economies of the United States and European Union from 
their markets. Regional Rivalry is the more likely route, with the United States and the 
European Union vying for regional marketshare and entrenching state policy in regional 
security communities. The rise in nontariff trade barriers from September 1986 to 
September 1987 suggests this trend. 
Due to the unilateral order, today the economic order follows a pattern of 
Managed Multilateralism, led by the United States, the WTO, and the IMF and World 
Bank ¾ the latter two regimes functioning within the UN System. In this fashion, the 
management of multilateralism is viewed as a “push” and “pull” system, with 
international actors making demands ¾ “pulling” and international regimes responding 
in kind ¾ “pushing.” As long as the system is managed, the system is autarkic. However, 
when demands exceed the ability of regimes to respond proportionately in kind, the 
system becomes challenged and, more specifically, the manager of the system is 
challenged. This is clearly the case with the United States and the European Union. The 
demands by Europeans of the US-sponsored monetary regimes in the 1950s exceeded the 
US capacity to respond proportionately, and gave rise to a recession in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s.  
 
In the aftermath of the Soviet dissolution and East European integration, 
“the United States ¼ went along with a French proposal for a European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which included the 
Soviet Union¼Here again, although the United States was the largest 
country, it was willing to see the preponderance of votes in the bank as 
well as the presidency go to the West Europeans.”269 
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With the EU establishment of the Union and Single Market in 1993 and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which is fashioned on the model of 
the IBRD to help East European countries make the transition to free-market economies, 
the reins of leadership in the economic order appear to be passing to Europe.  
 
3. Hegemonic Competition 
 
The view towards US hegemony has always been viewed by Europe with 
skepticism. In order to subvert the asymmetrical power balance imposed by the United 
States, the European Community systematically constructed mechanisms “to reduce or 
terminate the free flow of goods, people, funds and ideas” to change the patron-client 
relationship.270 The European solution to this asymmetrical relationship led the European 
Community to further diversify external contacts, build regional coalitions, and enter into 
regional integration schemes as a way of escaping US hegemonic domination. 271 This 
process led to supranational governance early in EC development, to achieve sufficient 
power to wield in balancing (when negotiating in a unipolar international system) the 
United States or binding (when negotiating in a bipolar system) the Soviets. “De Gaulle 
[once] denounced supranationality as a trap because an external ‘federator’, the United 
States, would be the puppeteer.”272 Ironically, the United States, as a single actor, used 
the same techniques of binding and balancing when dealing with Europe and the Soviets, 
respectively. Only after the 1970s, with the onset of an economic recession and the 
introduction of détente and the Anti-ballistic Missile negotiations did the US shift tactics. 
From the 1970s, the United States tended to bandwagon an increasingly strong Europe 
and bind with treaties the increasingly flexible Soviets. This trend continues in the post-
Cold War era with the European Union; however, with Russia, the trend has been to 
                                                 
270 George, p. 33. 
271 George, p. 34. 
272 Hoffman, Stanley and Robert O. Keohane, The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, p. 31. 
 76
continue binding while inviting them to bandwagon. Hoffman expresses, “Indeed, the 
capacity of the United States to act militarily, in a way that the European Community can 
only aspire to in a hypothetical distant future, remains its major source of political 
leverage over European politics.”273  
Despite the 1979-1984 recession, characterized as Eurosclerosis, the European 
Union experienced a rebound, a Europhoria, from 1985, beginning with economically 
linking the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) to the European Community within a 
Common European Economic Area. Sandholtz observes, “Europe appears to have both 
an industrial/technological base capable of providing for itself and the political will to 
maintain that capacity and respond to external constraints.”274 This apparent capability 
has espoused a new sense of equality with the United States. Cooper asserts, “Europe’s 
new sense of equality vis à vis the United States stems as much from the process of 
integration as from the raw statistics of size and economic performance.”275 According to 
the new WTO Agreement, which went into force in 1994, “the European Union counted 
as a single member but with votes equal to the number of its member states.”276 This has 
great implications for a Union hoping to continue to add to its future membership. 
 
4. European Security 
 
Regarding security institutions in Europe, the United States began to see a 
potential for a greater role for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) and its successor, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), in dampening conflicts in Eastern Europe, but following the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall, the United States began to see the CSCE/OSCE as a potential rival to NATO 
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for the organization of European Security. 277 Hoffman describes, “In practice, however, 
the CSCE/OSCE was hindered by its structure as an intergovernmental conference 
requiring unanimity.”278 Nevertheless, the United States halted its emphasis on the 
OSCE’s future role as conflict mediator in Europe.  
 The Persian Gulf showed that economic and military issues are becoming 
increasingly entangled with one another.279 The European’s ineffectual role in the 
Balkans and later in Kosovo prompted the pursuit of both a military and a capability 
revision. Charles Heyman emphasizes, “The WEU has no standing forces or command 
structures of its own, but has procedures by which the Council can assemble the force 
groupings necessary to undertake operations and ensure their political control and 
strategic direction.”280  
At the end of its existence, the Western European Union had five force structures 
which were “answerable to the WEU (FAWEU)” for operations. Although most of these 
force structures were also “NATO assigned or earmarked” formations, none of these 
formations were placed under WEU authority in peacetime. Even the EUROCORPS, a 
five-nation military formation, initially founded by President Mitterand and Chancellor 
Kohl as the Franco-German Corps to serve as the core of the future European Army, was 
declared a “FAWEU” but not put under WEU command. The WEU Rome Summit in 
May 1993 also declared the Multinational Division Central and the UK/Netherlands 
Amphibious Force as FAWEU. 281 In 1996, both the establishments of the EUROFOR 
and EUROMARFOR were similar in concept.282  The Western European Union was 
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tasked to conduct a myriad of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking. These are 
commonly called “the Petersberg tasks.”283 These tasks largely involve peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions. NATO was still reponsible for the collective defense of Europe. 
 
5. Shifting Balance of Economic Power 
 
Although the United States has provided economic and socio-political leadership 
since the onset of the Post-WWII era, “the United States appears increasingly unwilling 
to shoulder the political burden of this leadership, a burden that requires abjure unilateral 
protectionist measures, even in the face of protectionism by US trading partners.”284 In 
the face of US reluctance, European firms have taken the lead in applying advanced 
technology to hold market position more successfully than their US counterparts.285  
The debate that now exists concerns to what extent the United States is still the 
sole economic superpower and how it intends to preserve that status.  
 
Although in the early and mid-eighties there was a disagreement among 
economists over the degree to which a trade deficit is a sign of weakness 
(the US over-consuming, saddling future generations with the bill) or a 
sign of strength (foreign investors flocking to higher real returns available 
in a dynamic US market), there was a widespread consensus by the end of 
the decade that a significant improvement in US competitiveness and trade 
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Table 2.1: Trade Balances (In Billions of Dollars) 
Country 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
EC-12* -3.8 -3.6 -8.1 -81.3 8.1 
US 1.4 5.5 0.8 -6.2 -89.1 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Directory of Trade Statistics, Washington, DC, various years. *The European 
Community (EC-12) countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Greece, and the United Kingdom. 
 
From 1980 through 1985 ¼ US growth (2.7%) considerably outpaced that 
of the EC (1.5%) and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) members 
(2.0%). This is the period that gave rise to the apprehensions of long-term 
‘Eurosclerosis’ ¾ endemic low rates of growth. 287  
 
Ultimately, these apprehensions became unfounded. Cooper observes, “During the period 
from 1985 to 1989 ¼ both the European and US economies increased their average 
annual real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate substantially, 3.1% and 3.4% 
respectively.”288 This period of “Europhoria left the impression that the European 
economy in the 1990s [was] likely to speed away from a lumbering US economy mired 
in political and financial stalemate.”289  
 
As for the one remaining superpower, the United States, it has an economy 
roughly equal size to that of Europe. It could follow a mercantilist 
balancing strategy, an option that is preserved by its efforts to create a 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).290  
 
This balancing strategy lends legitimacy to the rise of the European Union as an 
economic contender to US hegemony, which threatens to inspire “Regional Rivalry, a 
twenty-first-century regional version of mercantilism[, which] is likely to emerge from 
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the redistribution of resources and the increasing obsolescence of the US-led post war 
system.”291 
One strategy in the quest for gaining marketshare through Regional Rivalry 
threatens to be the use of humanitarian aid. In this manner, a regional economic hegemon 
garners goodwill from the recipients of aid. Forty percent of EC development aid goes to 
“Asia and, to a lesser degree Latin America.”292 Generally, “the motives for third 
countries to turn towards Europe may be of a very different nature. One factor to take 
into account is the overall political situation in a given region.”293 Because of EU 
developmental aid policies, groups like ASEAN and the Central American states have 
little room to negotiate the terms dictated by Europe. 294 
 
D. ECONOMIC RIVALRY AND REGIONAL BATTLEFIELDS 
 
Today, the world is becoming more subdivided, reflecting a trend by powerful 
nations to enter into Regional Rivalry ¾ staking a claim in a region and developing 
preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) and zones of peace through security 
communities.  
 
The threat of conflict increases as the world economy evolves into 
American, Asian, and European regions, together accounting for above 70 
percent of global GDP, and separately driven more by internal than 
interregional developments. The collapse of the Soviet Union does not 
change the significance of this emerging economic regionalization. 295  
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The reality of the current international system reflects that former imperial powers are the 
only powers with the resources to intervene in the third world, which does not foster 
confidence among the governing elites of vulnerable developing countries, who have an 
“obsession with security.”296 
 
1. Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) 
 
The European Union and the United States are each other’s main trading partners 
and account for the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world. The total amount of 
two-way investment amounts to over $US 9.39 billion [11 billion Euro], with each 
partner employing about 3 million people in the other country. In the year 1999, exports 
of EU goods to the United States amounted to $US 155.5 billion [182 billion Euro], while 
imports from the United States amounted to $US 135 billion [158 billion Euro]. Despite 
several trade related disputes hitting the headlines, the transatlantic partners have 
committed to a politically and economically significant cooperation agenda. The signing 
of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and accompanying EU-US Joint Action Plan in 
December 1995 cemented this. The bilateral section of the NTA focuses on the creation 
of a New Transatlantic Marketplace by progressively breaking down barriers to the flow 
of goods, services and investment between the European Union and the United States.297 
 Richard Haass emphasizes, “Developments beyond the continent of Europe often 
constitute a source of tension between the United States and the countries of Western 
Europe.”298 The sudden watershed of events, which ended the Cold war era “reduced the 
obvious necessity and momentum for transatlantic cooperation, especially in the security 
sphere.”299 As the European Union attains a more equitable footing with the United 
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States in economic spheres, an ever increasing “friction (and decreased cooperation) 
characterizes relations across the Atlantic on policies toward problem countries.”300 This 
phenomena is a result of the fundamentally different approach that each has to problem 
solving. 
Americans tend to act unilaterally without formal authorization, quickly resorting 
to economic sanctions, or cruise missiles, whereas the European’s preference is for 
diplomacy and engagement.301  
 
One change that would contribute a great deal to calming transatlantic 
tensions would be an American decision to eliminate secondary 
sanctions. Much of the recent strain between Americans and Europeans 
stems from the US resort to secondary sanctions against those European 
entities and persons who do not implement primary sanctions instituted 
by the United States against a specified target.302 
 
At the London EU-US Summit, May 18, 1998, national leaders adopted a joint 
statement on the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP) identifying a series of 
initiatives to intensify and extend multilateral and bilateral cooperation in trade and 
investment between the United States and the European Union. The summit followed 
from the confidence-building process in the New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995, which 
reinforces US-EU efforts to resolve bilateral trade issues and disputes. The recent 
Summit on 14 June 2001 in Göteburg, Sweden dealt with a variety of economic and soft 
security issues. 
Following closely on the heels of the Göteburg Summit, EU Trade Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy and his Chinese counterpart, Trade Minister Shi Guangsheng, announced on 
                                                 
300 Ibid, p. 3. 
301 Ibid, p. 228. 
302 Ibid, p. 235. Agreements announced in May 1998 appear to reflect a good deal 
of progress concerning Iran, Libya, and Cuba. In return for commitments by the 
Europeans that will halt future investment in Cuba, the United States has agreed to seek 
changes from Congress that would give the president greater authority to waive certain 
sanctions against European countries doing business in Cuba. 
 83
20 June that the outstanding bilateral issues between the European Union and China with 
a view to China's accession to the WTO have been resolved. Welcoming the consensus, 
Commissioner Lamy said, 
  
The political will sha red by both the EU and China to clear the obstacles 
to China's WTO accession has borne fruit. The way is now clear for China 
to join the WTO in the coming months. This is good news for China, for 
the EU and for the world's multilateral trading system. We will now work 
together in Geneva to rapidly finalise agreements in the WTO.303  
 
This event is telling for EU-China relations and has far-reaching implications for US and 
Asia-Pacific economic and security relations. 
 
2. Organization of American States and Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) 304 
 
The Organization of American States (OAS) was founded in 1948 and has since 
been committed to democratic strengthening, security promotion, and economic 
integration in the North American hemisphere, as well as the defense of human rights, 
environmental protection, preservation of culture, and modernization of member 
states.305 The OAS has largely progressed in the realm of human rights, but also clearly 
leads in hemispheric security arrangement initiatives.  
 
In 1992, the General Assembly of the OAS raised the level of the Working 
Groups on Hemispheric Security by transforming them into the Special 
                                                 
303 Trade Directorate-General of the European Commission, “EU Finalises 
Bilateral Deal for China’s Accession to WTO,” Reference 118200, received by email 
June 20, 2001. 
304 A free trade area is one in which members remove trade barriers among 
themselves, but keep their separate national barriers against trade with the outside world. 
FTAA would incorporate all volunteer countries in North, Central and South America. 
305 Organization of American States, accessed at www.oas.org/ on June 21, 2001. 
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Commission on Hemispheric Security ¼ creating the legal- institutional 
bond between the OAS and the Inter-American Defense Board.306  
 
The OAS supports four strategic principles for intervention in the hemisphere: trade, 
protecting the environment, defense of democracy, and protection and defense of human 
rights.307 
The invasions of Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), and Haiti (1915 and 1994) 
showed the backlash that results when crossing US purposes.308 Although Central and 
South America received much attention during the 1970s with the proliferation of 
democracies throughout those regions, in the post-Cold War era they receive little 
attention.  
 
Security relations at the beginning of the decade were a paradoxical mix of 
fears of neglect and abandonment except when a flash of US attention 
directed its enormous, unilateral will at a country or problem in the region. 
The United States was perceived as an unpredictable and inconsistent 
hemispheric neighbor.309  
 
The profound impact of the collapse of the USSR and Cuba’s significance for security in 
the western hemisphere altered dramatically the US focus for regional security; the 
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) followed closely after the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative.310  
                                                 
306 Aravena, Francisco Rojas, et al, Strategic balance and Confidence Building 
Measures in the Americas, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 186. 
307 Ibid, p. 187. 
308 Franko, Patrice M. Toward a New Security Architecture in the Americas: The 
Strategic Implications of the FTAA, District of Columbia: The CSIS Press, 2000, p. 9. 
309 Ibid, p. 9. 
310 Aravena, p. 65. The Caribbean Basin Initiative is the General Scheme of 
Preferences and Section 936 of the US Internal Revenue Code, which gives tax credit to 
US businesses that invest in the Caribbean Basin. The Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative promised a reduction of Latin America’s official debt owed the US government, 
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Patrice Franko reflects,“On June 27, 1990, George Bush announced the Enterprise 
for the Americas initiative to a group of Latin Americans assembled in the White 
House.”311 This was historic, in a sense, because the United States seemed to be “issuing 
an invitation to play by market rules,” rather than its own, “with enhanced flows of 
investment capital as the prize.”312 More likely, the United States sought to use economic 
advantage to promote strategic gains within Latin America and the Caribbean. Franko 
asserts, “Nothing enhances US security more than to be part of a community of nations 
with shared commitments to peace, democracy, and economic freedom.”313 The EAI 
became a US attempt to make a big policy change toward the southern regions. Due to 
the starkly different approach to US policy and the anticipated shortfalls for debt 
reduction, the EAI “generated suspicions about US intentions. Critics within the region 
suggested that the initiative was a mechanism to lock Latin American nations into a hub-
and-spoke trading arrangement, with the United States at the center of regional 
activity.”314 “Brazilian officials place little value on comparative notions of power,” 
within the region, noting “there is such disparity of national scales, geographic settings, 
interests, and arrangements in the hemisphere.”315 The EAI initiative fostered fear and 
distrust among many nations-states in Latin America, which advocated strengthening 
subregional trading blocs in order to gain economic ascendancy over the United States in 
regional economic matters.316 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                                                 
offered help to facilitate investment in the region’s economic recovery, and held out the 
prospect of free trade agreements. 
311 Franko, p. 10. 
312 Ibid, p. 10. 
313 Ibid, p. 11. 
314 Ibid, p. 12. Although President Bush hoped to provide $310 million for debt 
reduction, the 101st Congress provided only $50 million for debt reduction and an 
additional $40 million for Food for Peace programs. 
315 Aravena, p. 52. 
316 Franko, p. 12. 
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from this important and desirable economic innovation [EAI] emerged 
NAFTA,  ¼ almost a year later, President Clinton hosted a Summit of the 
Americas in Miami to celebrate a multifaceted ‘new movement’ in the 
hemisphere and initiated what hopefully will be a sustained era of close 
hemispheric cooperation on a wide range of political, economic, and social 
issues and the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas by the year 
2005.317 
 
3. North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)318 
 
Prior to the 1980s, the United States exercised multilateral trade practices, 
however, from the mid-1980s, the US position changed from a total commitment to free 
trade to a “two-track approach resorting to preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) as a 
way to achieve trade liberalization in addition to supporting the open multilateral 
system.”319 The trend suggests that more countries are beginning to strengthen their 
PTAs at the expense of the open multilateral trading system and multilateral trade 
liberalization. Anne Krueger explains, “The issue of the net effect of PTAs on the welfare 
of the member countries and on the world economy is therefore an empirical issue.”320  
                                                 
317 Aravena, p. 65. Consequently, the EU Securities Market is presently scheduled 
to be implemented in 2005. The European Councils of Lisbon and Stockholm have 
endorsed the Action Plan. They have set 2005 as the target date for the implementation of 
the Plan and 2003 for final integration of the securities markets. Of the initial 41 
measures, 16 have now been finalized. 
318 NAFTA includes Canada, the United States, and Mexico. 
319 Krueger, Anne O. NAFTA’s Effects: A Preliminary Assessment, Malden: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2000, p. 761. 
320 Ibid, p. 762. Interest in PTAs focuses on two phenomena ¾ trade creation and 
trade diversion. Trade creation is the process under which countries lowering their tariffs 
shift away from reliance on high-cost domestic industry to imports from the lower-cost 
partner countries. Trade diversion occurs where low-cost production in the rest of the 
world is displaced by higher-cost production in the partner country. 
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NAFTA was controversial in both Mexico and the United States from the moment 
it became a strong political possibility in 1990.321 Mexico was an original signatory to 
the 1960 Treaty of Montevideo, which created the Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA).322 Mexico, therefore, hesitated to join NAFTA for fear that the 
United States would exploit NAFTA and force Mexico to change its policies, thereby, 
weakening Mexican sovereignty. Nevertheless, Mexico joined NAFTA through a treaty 
in 1992. Although initially very controversial, NAFTA came into force in 1994, despite 
US protests that jobs would head south. 323 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 reflect that NAFTA has 
had a small impact for the United States. For Mexico, NAFTA has not been seriously 
trade-diverting. 324 By 1996, the United States, Canada, and Mexico had achieved a 
combined GNP of nearly $US 8 trillion with a population of nearly 400 million. GNP 
statistics rivaled those of the European Union, but the European Union was less 
populous.325  
 
The goals of NAFTA are to phase out all tariffs on textiles, clothing, cars, 
trucks, vehicle parts and telecommunications equipment over ten years; to 
phase out all barriers to agricultural trade over 15 years; to allow banks, 
securities firms and insurance firms total access to all three markets; to 
open up the North American advertising market; to allow lorry drivers to 
cross borders freely; and to loosen the rules on the movement of corporate 
executives and some professionals.326  
 
                                                 
321 Lindert, p. 222. 
322 McCormick, p. 23. LAFTA failed to achieve the modest goals of reducing 
tariff and trade barriers on selected items and to create a free trade zone by 1972. Seven 
signatory countries signed the treaty in 1960: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, and Uruguay. 
323 Lindert, p. 222. 
324 Krueger, p. 762. 
325 McCormick, p. 20. 
326 Ibid, pp. 21, 22. 
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Preferential trading arrangements did not seem significant for NAFTA or other trading 
blocs, but in the case of NAFTA (Table 3.1), the impact on exports from non-PTA 
members was sizeable.327 Export capital flows in NAFTA reflect a marked change in US 
exports to NAFTA countries after the agreement came into force in 1994, reflecting an 
increase in access to the market by non-member countries like the European Union. 
Within four years, the European Union was able to gain an 11% export marketshare in 
NAFTA, despite the empirical finding, which implied “that NAFTA countries import less 
than predicted from non-NAFTA trading partners.”328 Table 3.2.1 shows that the 
European Union closely rivals the United States for import share within NAFTA: 11% 
EU versus 16% US. 
 
Table 3.1: Export Capital Flows in NAFTA 














US 26033.3 13757.9 14361.3 15778.7 18458.6 19430.2 20913.1
EU 10300 11907 12923 13684 15234 16990 18379
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, 
multiple years.  
 
                                                 
327 Krueger, p. 774. 
328 Ibid, p. 775. Indeed, comprehensive data are available only through 1996 or 
1997, thus allowing observation of only the first three or four years of operation of 
NAFTA. This period does not extend even halfway through the tariff phase out period, 
and probably is not even long enough to allow for adjustment lags in any event. 
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Table 3.1.1: 1999 Marketshares of NAFTA Exports 










Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly 






Table 3.2: Import Capital Flows in NAFTA 














US 12570.9 14870 17235.3 19122.4 21156.7 22462.7 25669.2
EU 10189 11459 13558 14181 15295 16315 16591
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, 





Table 3.2.1: 1999 Marketshares of NAFTA Imports 










Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly 
Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, multiple years. 
 
4. European Free Trade Area (EFTA)329  
 
Suspicious of the “closeness of ties proposed by Monnet and Schuman” for the 
integration of European countries, Britain “decided to pursue the idea of a wider but 
looser free trade area based on the OEEC states, but preparation for the European 
Economic Community had gone too far, and then in 1960 the OEEC evolved into the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).”330 Hence, Britain 
became a founding member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The EFTA 
was not successful as an autarkic trading bloc unto itself, because most of its members 
did most trade through the European Community. In 1984, a Free Trade Area was 
established between the remaining EFTA members and the European Community. 
Within this new arrangement, called the European Economic Area, “the EFTA countries 
also enjoy free access to the Common Market on the basis of complete reciprocity.”331 
                                                 
329 EFTA formed in 1960. The current membership includes Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. 
330 McCormick, pp. 70, 71. Founding members included Austria, Britain, 
Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. Membership was voluntary 
through the Stockholm Convention, signed in January 1960, as opposed to EC 
membership, which was contractual in accordance with the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Most 
of the EFTA members have formalized EU membership. Switzerland is a special case. 
331 Edwards, p. 8. 
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It is clear from Tables 4.1 and 4.2 that the combining of the EFTA with the 
European Community into the European Economic Area in 1984 made a significant 
upswing in EU export and import capital flows, though there was little impact on US 
capital flows. It is somewhat less clear what the impact of the merger of EFTA with the 
European Community was for the EFTA countries, but it appears that, at least initially, 
these countries lost marketshare in both exports and imports to the other countries in the 
EFTA-EC Free Trade Area. The impact on US exports and imports was decidedly 
negligible. Tables 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.2.1, and 4.2.2 reflect EU dominance in export and 
import capital flows over the United States. 
 
Table 4.1: Export Capital Flows in EFTA 
















US 368.7 617.1 788.9
EU 4159.9 5053.7 9434
1978 1983 1988
 
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistics of Foreign Trade, Monthly 
Bulletin , Vol. 12, multiple years. Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics 















Table 4.1.1: 1983 Marketshare of EFTA Exports 









Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly 







Table 4.1.2: 1988 Marketshare of EFTA Exports 









Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly 




Table 4.2: Import Capital Flows in EFTA 
















US 459.3 643.9 1132
EU 4730.4 4949.3 8897
1978 1983 1988
 
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistics of Foreign Trade, Monthly 
Bulletin , Vol. 12, multiple years. Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics 











Table 4.2.1: 1983 Marketshare of EFTA Imports 









Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistics of 





Table 4.2.2: 1988 Marketshare of EFTA Imports 










Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly 
Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, multiple years. 
 
5. European Economic Area (EEA)332 
 
In 1984, the European Community and EFTA members began negotiations to 
create an EEC-EFTA Free Trade Area, followed by continued negotiations in the late 
1980’s for a “European economic space.”333 With the completion of the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, the way was paved for the formation of the European Economic Area in 
1994.  
It is clear from Tables 5.1 and 5.2 that the synergy of the completion of the Single 
European Act in 1992 and the initialization of the EEA in 1994 produced a marked 
upswing for EU exports and imports.334 Again, the effectiveness of the EEA trade bloc 
against US access to the market is quite strong. Tables 5.1.1 and 5.2.1 reflect EU 
dominance over the United States in EEA capital flows. 
                                                 
332 EEA was formed in 1994 and membership includes the EFTA plus the EU-15.  
333 Hoffman, Stanley and Robert O. Keohane, The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, p. 8. 
334 The European Economic Community from 1957-1992 included a customs 
union along with other agreements. A customs union is one in which members remove all 
barriers to trade among themselves and adopt a common set of external barriers. After 
Maastricht, the European Union formed a common market, in which members allow full 
freedom of factor flows among themselves in addition to having a customs union. 
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Table 5.1: Export Capital Flows in EEA 














US 8968.9 9101.9 10723.9 12542.1
EU 77660 86733 112612 118502
1992 1994 1996 1998
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, 








Table 5.1.1: 1999 Marketshares of EEA Exports 










Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly 





Table 5.2: Import Capital Flows in EEA 














US 8138.5 9787.2 11594.9 14479.5
EU 78386 80473 103263 108507
1992 1994 1996 1998
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, 
multiple years.  
 
 
Table 5.2.1: 1999 Marketshares of EEA Imports 









Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly 
Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, multiple years. 
 
6. Central and Eastern Europe  
 
a. Political Background and Security Architecture  
 
Newly transitioning states to liberal market economies are vulnerable to 
threats normally aimed at internal security. This was a clear concern to the great powers 
as the dissolution of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Bloc took effect in the late 1980s. The 
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single greatest threat to European integration has been the volatility of the new European 
landscape and its consequential political landscape since the early 1990s. Stephen Blank 
posits, “Failure to incorporate Russia and the New Independent States (NIS) into the 
European and global economies is perhaps the greatest potential economic obstacle to 
realizing the proposed vision of Europe.”335 Before incorporation can happen, Russia 
must adopt fundamental changes to its institutions and economic policies, which promote 
democracy and foreign direct investment.  
Other security issues, which threaten European integration include conflict 
in the Balkans, Greek-Turkish tensions, trouble spots along the Mediterranean, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conflicts in the Transcaucasus 
region, and tensions over the control of oil. Also, “one cannot ignore a EU-US trade war 
that could sidetrack the preferred vision of a future Europe.”336 Europeans must reorient 
national interests to solve largely European problems. To the same degree, the United 
States must seek consensus rather than relying on unilateral action on ma tters involving 
Europe.337  
The United States must realize that not all European initiatives are 
directed to undermine US leadership. Blank purports, “The United States must 
understand that a Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) may not always coincide 
with US policy.”338 The United States should take a greater role in assisting Central and 
Eastern European countries to transition to consolidated democracies with liberal free-
market economies beyond those efforts expended on the Partnership for Peace. Cent ral 
and Eastern European integration into the European Union is one option, but may not be 
in the best interest of the United States in the long run. “The important decision made at 
                                                 
335 Blank, Stephen J. et al, European Security: Washington’s Shaping Strategy in 
Action, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle: Publications and Productions Office, 2000, p. 
8. 
336 Ibid, et al, p. 9. 
337 Ibid, et al, p. 16. 
338 Ibid, et al, p. 18. 
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the EU Helsinki Summit in December 1999 to open membership accession negotiations 
to expand the community from 15 to 28 or more countries is noteworthy for European 
security.”339 This will have a great impact on US involvement in Europe. Blank 
describes, “The size and focus of the US presence in Europe undoubtedly will change. 
Force size, structures, and organizations will adapt to accommodate evolving security 
conditions.”340 Lastly, “economic competition between the United States and Europe or 
among large regional trading blocs for global or regional markets could be intense, 
further magnifying the divergence of interests.”341 
 
b. Economic Competition 
 
Policy changes and EU focus after Maastricht in 1992 may explain the 
downturn of capital flows of the European Union to and from Central and Eastern Europe 
through 1994 (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). At Maastricht, Europeans set the timetable for the 
introduction of a common currency in 1999, the new rights for European “citizenship,” 
and new policies concerning health and social programs.342 Agreements began to come 
“into force in 1994 with Hungary and Poland, with the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 







                                                 
339 The Economist, “The Fado Factor,” January 15, 2000, pp. 51, 52. 
340 Blank, et al, p. 23. 
341 Ibid, et al, p. 31. 
342 McCormick, p. 80.  
343 Ibid, p. 223. 
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Table 6.1: Export Capital Flows in Central and Eastern Europe 
















US 93 201.4 76.7 52.5
EU 1297 3450 2544 1064
1990 1993 1996 1999
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, multiple years. 
* The 1996 figures reflect de facto integration of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO in 1994.  






Table 6.2: Import Capital Flows in Central and Eastern Europe344 















US 93.7 143.3 82.8 83.6
EU 1406 2757 1697 951
1990 1993 1996 1999
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, multiple years. 
* The 1996 figures reflect de facto integration of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into NATO in 1994.  
**The 1999 figures do not account for Albania, Bulgaria, or Slovenia.  
                                                 
 
 100
7. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)345 
 
a. Political Background and Security Architecture 
 
Nigeria became a founding member and was the impetus behind the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May 1975.346 Nigeria is by 
far the largest, wealthiest, and most powerful member of the bloc of sixteen countries 
with 53 percent of the population. 347 “There are ¼ 16 Sub-Saharan countries that 
constitute the ECOWAS. There are 36 corresponding international boundaries, 27 of 
which are located entirely within the subregion.”348 This situation makes for a very 
diverse economic, social, and political landscape. West Africa was partitioned by five 
distinct powers, the largest number concentrated on any single African subregion, unlike 
the partitioning of other regions by only two or three powers.349  
 
Quite apart from the adjacency with both North and Central African 
subregions and the linkages therefrom with the rest of Africa, notably 
Southern Africa as well as East Africa and the Horn, the location of the 13 
of the 16 West African States along the Atlantic Seaboard makes the 
subregion the most crucial ‘gateway’ between post- industrial North (North 
America and Western Europe) and the rest of ‘Third-World’ Africa.350  
                                                 
345 ECOWAS countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, 
The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. 
346 McCormick, p. 27. 
347 Ibid, p. 28. 
348 United Nations, “Disarmament: Workshop on the Role of Border Problems in 
African Peace and Security,” New York: Litho in UN, October, 1993, p. 77. 
349Ibid, p. 78. France, Germany, Portugal, Germany, and Americo-Liberian for 
whom the United States had created independent Liberia following the abolition of the 
slave trade in the 18th Century. Thus, in West Africa, there are three major surviving 
blocs of states: the Anglophone (British and American), the Francophone and the 
Lusophone. 
350 Ibid, p. 79. 
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This “gateway” makes West Africa a strategic asset to the economies that are firmly 
entrenched in the West African security and economic structures. 
The architecture of the African security system is diverse. Dan Henck 
explains, “The United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have long 
attempted to provide mechanisms for conflict resolution and have sometimes authorized 
humanitarian interventions or peace operations.”351 The future may find the African 
security environment represented in a number of ways. One is a “constellation of 
subregional systems, with perhaps, Nigeria dominant in the west, South Africa in the 
south, and Ethiopia in the central area.”352 It is also possible that there may be a “split 
along political lines with democratic/free market states in some sort of loose grouping,” 
under South African leadership and a “cabal of authoritarian states” led by Nigeria.353 In 
order to elicit cooperation and shape the security structure, “subregional organizations 
have been a feature of Africa’s political landscape for decades.”354 Because regional and 
subregional leaders have sought common membership in the OAU and the ECOWAS, it 
might be implied that there is a presumption to solidarity by these leaders.355  
The OAU has been weakened by schisms between African states and the 
power structures in state governments, which allocate nearly all power to summits of the 
heads of states of member nations.356  
 
Still, their responsibility regarding conflict resolution spans several broad 
missions: decolonization power struggles ¾ for independent nations 
seeking to assert their right to control their own destinies, political 
                                                 
351 Henk, Dan and Steven Metz, The United States and the Transformation of 
African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond, Strategic Studies 
Institute, Carlisle: Publications and Productions Office, December 1997, p. 3. 
352 Ibid, p. 6. 
353 Ibid, p. 6. 
354 Ibid, p. 5. 
355 United Nations, p. 81. 
356 Henk, p. 3. 
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consolidation ¾ for polities transitioning from colonial to national 
polities, national consolidation ¾ stemming from wars of national 
integration, leftover liberation movements ¾ involving remnants of 
anti-state factions, ill-defined territory ¾  stemming from legitimacy 
claims on post-colonial borders, structural rivalries ¾ resulting from 
growth into new political roles, and runaway means ¾ stemming from 
militaries that have attained the power to overthrow their own 
governments.357  
 
Complicating matters more, “an increasing number of nations are abandoning state 
dominated economic models in favor of outward looking, market based systems.”358 This 
makes multilateral negotiation in African security communities a must, despite the 
traditional US desire to seek bilateral agreement s. 
ECOWAS is another economic organization that moved into the security 
arena “with the dispatch of a multinational peacekeeping force to Liberia in 1990. This 
force, known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group or ‘ECOMOG’, illustrated some of the 
political difficulties inherent in peacekeeping by African forces.”359 Much of Africa’s 
problems stem from poverty and inequitable access to the limited goods and benefits of 
African trade.360 Thus far, comity and cooperation, achieved through subregional 
economic organizations like ECOWAS, is proving successful. 361  
Other international organizations influence the African security 
environment as well. Financial and monetary organizations like the World Bank, African 
Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund affect Africa’s economic 
development which is, in turn, a vital component of stability.362 “As Susan Rice, 
                                                 
357 Obaseki, Nosakhare O. African Regional Security and the OAU’s Role in the 
Next Decade, A Report of the International Police Academy, New York: Workshop at 
Mohonk Mountain House, November 1983, pp. 18-22. 
358 Henk, p. 1. 
359 Ibid, p. 5. 
360 Ibid, p. 20. 
361 Ibid, p. 18. 
362 Ibid, p. 5. 
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Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, put it, ‘There is now more reason for 
optimism about Africa’s future than at any time in recent memory’.”363 
  
The administration ¼ has called attention to the potential of Sub-Saharan 
Africa as a largely untapped market for US products. The clear implication 
is that economic development in Africa could bear tangibly and directly 
on US economic well-being as well as its own. 364  
 
The US approach, to date, has been somewhat clouded and reticent. In contrast to a 1995 
Department of Defense document, which bluntly declared that the United States has 
“very little traditional strategic interest in Africa,”365 US Secretary of State, Colin 
Powell, has shown remarkable interest in the region, pledging millions in monetary aid, 
while on an official tour through Africa, to combat AIDS in Africa.366 The uncoordinated 
announcement by then Secretary of State Warren Christopher in October 1996 for the 
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was received by African leaders with 
puzzlement, because there had been no prior consultation on the matter and resulted in a 
perception of American failure to recognize subregional security organizations as 
vehicles for conflict resolution. 367 If the present administration wishes to make more 
positive headway, “the Department of State must pay careful attention to solidifying the 
links between ACRI and the Organization of African Unity. And ACRI must be better 
linked to the security programs of subregional organizations.”368 The 1997 National 
Security Strategy pointed out that American interests in Africa are concerned with safety 
                                                 
363 Ibid, p. 1. 
364 Ibid, p. 20. 
365 United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense Office of International Security Affairs, August 1995, p. 3. 
366 BBC News, “US Pledges Uganda $50m AIDS Cash,” May 28, 2001, accessed 
at news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1355000/1355352.stm, on June 21, 
2001. 
367 Henk, pp. 23, 24. 
368 Ibid, p. 32. 
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from transnational threats and WMD, an end to regional conflict, a stable region 
characterized by sustainable economic growth, and a region in which democracy and 
respect for human rights are increasingly evident.”369 The Permanent 3 countries, France; 
Great Britain; and the United States, agreed to establish an African Peacekeeping Group 
at a July 1997 meeting to contend with these issues.370 
 
It has been aptly observed that ‘the only way to settle wars is to use the 
same principles upon which they were fought’, and, since ‘most wars have 
economic causes’, [a] genuine search must not be limited to political 
solutions as is conventionally the case; it should be extended to the 
discovery of the ‘economic basis of peace’. To achieve this conversion of 
‘principles’ of war into ‘basis of peace’, all that is required is a new 
method of thinking or what has been appropriately referred to as ‘a new 
political mentality’.371  
 
b. Economic Competition 
 
In 1973, with the ending of Apartheid, subsiding of racial disputes, and a 
return to a positive atmosphere for trade, ECOWAS reflects a huge upswing in 
marketshare for both capital flows, especially for the European Union (Tables 7.1 and 
7.2). Trade within West Africa is consistent with the expected greater marketshare going 
to former colonial holders within the European Union.  With the implementation of 
transportation infrastructure initiatives in the mid-1980s, there was a slight increase in 
EU import capital flows, which were not fully realized due to “Eurosclerosis” and a focus 
on European domestic issues associated with implementation of the Single Market Plan. 
The success stemming from Maastricht is reflected in the trends after 1994. 
                                                 
369 Ibid, p. 11. 
370 Ibid, p. 25. 
371 United Nations, p. 88. The strictly “economic basis of peace” and cooperation 
in the West African border operation is underscored by the fact of what Agnes Lambert 
and Johnny Egg, in a joint presentation at the 1989 Lome Seminar, have appropriately 
referred to as “a flourishing border trade, which has played an important role in the 
creation of an integrated market involving all or part of several countries” in the 
subregion. 
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Table 7.1: Export Capital Flows in ECOWAS 















US 65.9 120.4 131.6 101.2 173.3 168.2 232.9
EU 404.3 1360.8 864 954 1193 1256 1798
1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999
 
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistics of Foreign Trade, Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 12, multiple 
years. Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, multiple years. 
 
 
Table 7.2: Import Capital Flows in ECOWAS 
















US 331.1 813.9 555.6 542.2 710.9 692.5 858.3
EU 428.5 1130.2 1020 1006 1283 1378 2234
1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999
 
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistics of Foreign Trade, Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 12, multiple 





a. Political Background and Security Architecture 
 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group process seeks to 
liberalize trade in the region. The Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a 
venture formed in 1994 for discussing security issues. Richard Ellings points out, “These 
are the two salient, multilateral experiments in East Asia since the establishment of 
ASEAN in 1967.”372 
 
The Chinese and US economies are the two major ‘engines’ driving this 
[Asia-Pacific] growth. Chinese imports grew by more than 25 percent per 
year in 1992 and 1993. In a mutually beneficial relationship, trade with 
Southeast Asia is an important aspect of the US economy. American firms 
have invested more than $108 billion in East Asia, and two-way trade 
between the United States and the Asia-Pacific region was $425 billion in 
1994. This amount was 36 percent of total US trade and was over 40 
percent greater than US trade with Europe.373  
 
Although there have been extraordinary improvements in the economics of the region in 
recent years, “rapid change within and outside Southeast Asia has recently increased the 
level of insecurity in the region.”374 Due to the rapid transformation of East Asian 
economies, both Europe and the United States have had to quickly adjust, especially to 
Japan, which became a great economic regional mover regarding exports, technological 
competition, and financial expansion. 375 A great impetus to US and EU mercantilist 
                                                 
372 Ellings, Richard J. and Sheldon W. Simon, eds. Southeast Asian Security in 
the New Millenium, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, p. 4. 
373 Ibid, p. 5. 
374 Ibid, p. 4. 
375 Hoffman, Stanley and Robert O. Keohane, The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, p. 5. 
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tendencies ¾ “Asian states fear being shut out of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) as well as the European Union.”376 
During George Bush Senior’s administration, National Security Strategy 
emphasized humanitarian interests rather than strategic security. US “optimism over the 
end of the Cold War obscures the fact that the United States faces an era of severe global 
economic competition for market share and national economic vitality.”377 This could not 
be a more overstated fact as the situation exists in the Asia-Pacific. 
Southeast Asia is strategically important to the United States for three 
reasons: (1) its regional market is important, (2) it is a potentially unstable region due to 
intense economic and political competition between China and Japan, and (3) it is a 
strategic transit area for Middle Eastern oil. 378 The contentiousness of US influence in 
the region stems from an Asian-Pacific affinity for multilateralism, which marginalizes 
the US tradition of bilateralism. Additionally, following the Cold War, the United States 
drew down from over 165,000 to 100,000 forward deployed forces in Asia.379 Therefore, 
“relations in Southeast Asia are no longer exclusively brokered through unilateral ties 
with the United States.”380  
 
The parallel track of Asian Multilateralism lies in the political-security 
realm. Although America’s Cold War ended ¾ originated bilateral 
security arrangements remain in place, their relevance for such new 
security concerns as the South China Sea island disputes, overlapping 
                                                 
376 Ellings, p. 14. 
377 Butts, Kent H. The Department of Defense Role in African Policy, Strategic 
Studies Institute, Carlisle: Publications and Productions Office, March, 1993, p. 3. 
378 Ellings, p. 6. 
379 Cheng, Tun-jen and Hung-mao Tien, eds. The Security Environment in the 
Asia-Pacific, Studies of the Institute for National Policy Research, New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, 2000, p. 36. 
380 Ellings, p. 7. 
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maritime exclusion economic zones (EEZs), and regional burgeoning arms 
buildups [are] now problematic.381  
 
As a declining hegemon, the United States can no longer sustain important political, 
security and economic positions in the western Pacific either unilaterally or bilaterally.382 
Ellings explains, “As a heavily indebted mature economy, [the United States] can not 
absorb the export surpluses that characterized Asian development in the Cold War 
era.”383 These concerns have great implications for future negotiations with regional 
markets in the Asia-Pacific. 
Market forces have driven economic regionalism in the Asia-Pacific 
region, in contrast to Europe, rather than politics. The European Union evolved over a 
thirty-five year period through top-down political decisions with economies linked 
through negotiations among neighboring governments. Ellings relates, “In Asia, 
economic regionalism has been a product of market forces through which capital from 
Japan, the United States, and Europe has created linkages among Asian economies via 
transnational corporations and technology transfer.”384 Although Europe has developed a 
strong form of protectionism through its Union, Asia does not appear to be “sliding 
toward protectionism or inward looking regionalism.”385 
China remains an open question. It is a rising power with enormous 
growth potential, “capable, but technologically backward” and “militarily incapable of 
power projection,” therefore; the provisional National Government of Cambodia is not a 
serious mid-term threat to Asia-Pacific stability. Tun-jen Cheng and Hung-mao Tien 
describe, “In the areas of trade, finance, energy, investment, and arms sales, as well as 
                                                 
381 Ibid, pp. 14, 15. South China Sea disputes stem from overlapping claims by all 
littoral states plus Japan and Taiwan.  
382 Ibid, p. 15. 
383 Ibid, p. 30. 
384 Ibid, pp. 13, 14. 
385 Ibid, p. 15. 
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education and culture, Beijing has demonstrated evidence of moving toward a more 
cooperative and complementary behaviour with its neighbors with each passing year.”386 
The politics of energy in the region suggests growing Chinese interdependence.387 
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin visited China in 1997 and Beijing has since begun 
construction of natural gas pipelines from Russia. As payment in kind, China will 
undertake construction of a hydroelectric grid in the Russian Far East. Due to China’s 
dependence on Russia for oil, China appears to be modifying its notions of autarky and 
sovereign independence. The question of Taiwan also looms large. Essentially Taiwan 
will enjoy US-assured security in exchange for refraining from disturbing the Asian 
security environment. For Japan, 
 
avoiding any collective security commitments in Asia became an idée fixe 
of postwar Japanese diplomacy ¼ [building] an elaborate set of policies to 
prevent Japan being drawn into any overseas commitments whatsoever. 
When the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) were organized in 1954, 
the Upper House of the Diet passed a unanimous resolution opposing their 
overseas dispatch. Subsequent prime ministers maintained the position 
that any collective security agreement would be unconstitutional. Other 
subsequent, complementary policies included the three non-nuclear 
principles, the three principles proscribing arms and military technology 
exports, and the limitation of one percent of GNP for defense spending. 388 
 
                                                 
386 Cheng, p. 81. 
387 Ibid, p. 82. 
388 Ellings, p. 125. Immediately following the dissolution of Central and Eastern 
Europe, North America and Europe absorbed much of Japanese FDI, but Asia’s share 
grew rapidly. By 1991 Japan had become the largest foreign investor in Singapore, Hong 
Kong, the Philippines, and Thailand, and the second largest in Taiwan, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia. By 1992, Japan had invested $19.6 billion in Asian Newly Industrialized 
Economies (NIES) and $35 billion in ASEAN. Asian nations offered a growing market 
for Japanese goods. From 1986 to 1993 Japan’s trade surplus with Asian countries rose 
from $16.4 billion to $55.6 billion, exceeding its surplus with the United States for the 
first time. 
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Japan has expressed interest in taking a leadership role in the multilateral forum APEC 
group of regional economies, the nongovernmental Council for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and the Asean Regional Forum (ARF).389  
 
The greatest challenge facing the United States in Asia is balancing the 
critical need to sustain the US-Japanese security alliance with the equally 
compelling need to improve  Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations to 
avert a new Cold War in Asia.390  
 
The Pentagon’s “East Asia Strategy Report” (EASR) is the most definitive 
pronouncement on overall strategy towards east Asia, which identifies three security 
goals: (1) to foster Engagement, which involves modernizing and strengthening current 
US alliances, (2) to promote Enlargement, which entails reaching out beyond traditional 
US friends and allies to China, Russia, and Vietnam; and (3) to conduct Exploration of 
new multilateral security initiatives. Despite such an ambitious strategy, Asia has still 
sought out Europe both as a result of the advent of the single market and the single 
currency, as well as the 1997 Asian financial crisis.391  
Europe has made many overtures towards the region in recent years. The 
European Union supported the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the 
energy substitution scheme for North Korea’s nuclear plants, thereby fostering 
“Economic Security” on the peninsula.392 Europeans may have sought to balance the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group with ASEM, the Asia-Europe 
Meeting, a forum that fostered provisions for a greater European political presence and 
stronger political ties.393 ASEM may have been formed in 1996 in the hopes of 
leveraging Asian-European ties to allow Europe to compete economically with the 
                                                 
389 Cheng, pp. 37, 38. 
390 Ibid, p. 39. 
391 Ibid, p. 202. 
392 Ibid, p. 208. 
393 Ibid, p. 203.  
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United States. Cheng contends, “Europe is temporarily receding from strong policies and 
actions outside Europe, which are weakening on the eve of the crucial decisions 
regarding the euro currency; Europeans must come to terms with the notion that better 
relations with Asia can only be forged through political and security involvement in the 
broader sense.”394 Europeans may be coming to this understanding already in light of the 
European Union’s recent assistance in gaining China’s accession to the WTO. 
 
b. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
 
ASEAN was established in August 1967 to manage regional security 
interests, protect the region from big power rivalry, and provide a forum for the 
resolution of interregional problems.395 The nations of Southeast Asia have created the 
“ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to engage most of their Asia-Pacific neighbors for the 
first time in structured dialogue on broad-ranging Asian security issues,” expressed 
Cheng.396 ASEAN countries hope to mitigate Japanese dominance in the region through 
coalition-building and trade.397 
ASEAN functions as a regional security regime or security community. 398 
In this capacity, ASEAN exercises the following regional missions: (1) to enhance the 
                                                 
394 Ibid, p. 209, 213. 
395 McCormick, p. 25. ASEAN was formed in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and 
peace and security in Southeast Asia. It was later expanded to include Brunei, and 
Vietnam and, most recently, Laos and Myanmar (Burma). Cambodia was scheduled to 
join in 1997, but its entry was delayed due to political turmoil in Phnom Penh. 
396 Cheng, p. 37. The ARF consists of nine ASEAN states plus Australia, 
Cambodia, Canada, China, India, Japan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, New 
Zealand, the United States, and the European Community. Taiwan continues to be 
excluded. 
397 Edwards, p. 12. 
398 A regional security regime is a formal or informal arrangement for 
cooperation among adjacent or mainly adjacent states to maintain sovereignty in 
conditions of peace among themselves and with outside states. 
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welfare and security of member states, (2) to build mutual trust, (3) to solve regional 
problems jointly, (4) to collaborate with universal organizations to enhance ASEANs 
international status, (5) to regulate the presence of external powers, and (6) to develop a 
genuine Southeast Asia regional order.399 
 
c. Economic Competition 
 
Neither the United States nor the European Union holds a monopoly over 
the other in capital flows in ASEAN, but it is clear from Table 8.1 that the 1997 Asian 
crisis had an effect on export trends for both the United States and the European Union, 
whereas, import trends were not affected (Table 8.2). Tables 8.1.1 and 8.2.1 reflect the 
great US advantage over the European Union in export and import marketshare. In the 
Asia-Pacific countries, the onset of NAFTA may have had an effect for the United States 
in both exports and imports by drawing away US capital flows from the Asia-Pacific to 
NAFTA. Clearly, the Asian crisis is also reflected in this trend. Again, as in ASEAN, 
Tables 9.1.1 and 9.2.1 reflect only a slight US advantage over the European Union in 
Asia-Pacific marketshare. 
Table 8.1: Export Capital Flows in ASEAN 
















US 4006 3253.8 3295.9
EU 4143 2675 2563
1997 1998 1999
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 
12, multiple years.  
 
                                                 
399 Cheng, p. 190. 
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Table 8.1.1: 1999 Marketshare of ASEAN Exports 










Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly 









Table 8.2: Import Capital Flows in ASEAN 













US 5872.8 6039.6 6372.3
EU 4343 4565 4598
1997 1998 1999
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 





Table 8.2.1: 1999 Marketshare of ASEAN Imports 










Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly 







Table 9.1: Export Capital Flows in Asia-Pacific 















US 1802.1 4410.9 4767 9894.6 16005.8
EU 1149.7 2742.3 3465.9 8301 16353
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
 
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistics of Foreign Trade, Monthly 
Bulletin , Vol. 12, multiple years. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly Statistics 




Table 9.1.1: 1999 Marketshare of Asia-Pacific Exports 








Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, 




Table 9.2: Import Capital Flows in Asia-Pacific 














US 1926.1 5425.1 10776.2 16176.7 25841.7
EU 1394.3 4277.7 4400.5 12025 18923
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
 
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistics of Foreign Trade, Monthly 
Bulletin , Vol. 12, multiple years. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly Statistics 





Table 9.2.1: 1999 Marketshare of Asia-Pacific Imports 








Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, 
multiple years.  
 
9. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 400 
 
a. Political Background and Security Architecture 
 
In December 1991, four months after the attempted coup against Soviet 
President Gorbachev, the CIS was created. Although the individual republics had 
declared their independence, claims Dianne Smith, “they still did not think of themselves 
as entities beyond the collective. Their ‘national’ security was that of the CIS.”401  
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is made up of most of the 
former republics of the USSR. The 12 CIS members function as independent states; 
however, a central authority, modeled on the European Union, has restricted authority 
                                                 
400 Commonwealth of Independent States includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
and Uzbekistan. 
401 Smith, Dianne L. Breaking Away from the Bear, Strategic Studies Institute, 
Carlisle: Publications and Productions Office, August 1998, p. 3. The attempt to create a 
purely Slavic union in Minsk on December 8, 1991, was short-lived; within 2 weeks the 
five newly-independent Central Asian republics ¾ Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, plus Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, agreed to join 
the CIS. 
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that includes establishing a common economic sphere and coordinating foreign and 
immigration policies, environmental protection, and crime fighting. A Joint 
Commonwealth High Command serves as the chief coordinating body of the CIS. Early 
collective security efforts were unsuccessful.  
 
The first three CIS summits of 1992 in Moscow (January 16), Minsk 
(February 14), and Kiev (March 20) had failed to create a consensus on 
the form and substance of the new armed forces or to reach any agreement 
on a general CIS military budget, ‘the bedrock on which any significant 
CIS military structure would have to stand’.402  
 
Although the members adopted 13 documents at the Tashkent summit of May 1992, “the 
agreements did not produce a CIS collective security environment.”403 The treaty 
resembled a “Central Asian security pact.”404 The individual members, who were 
reluctant to form their own militaries, rather, opted to maintain “some type of unified 
command under Moscow.”405  
 
The reluctance of the Central Asian states to undertake the creation of 
their own militaries is not surprising, given their lack of a significant 
ethnic officer corps on which to draw, their interest in dedicating scarce 
economic resources to more pressing needs, and their general appreciation 
that they cannot effectively ensure their security independently. 406  
 
Nevertheless, Smith asserts, “once the Russian Federation decided to opt for a national 
force, one by one the other CIS states were forced to form their own as well.”407 
                                                 
402 Ibid, pp. 4, 5. 
403 Ibid, p. 5. 
404 Ibid, p. 5. 
405 Ibid, p. 6. 
406 Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. Central Asia and the World, New York: Council 
on Foreign Relations Press, 1994, p. 177. 
407 Smith, Breaking Away from the Bear, p. 6. 
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There are two key security regimes in the Central Asian region, the 
Shanghai Forum and the Central Asian Union (CAU), which was established between 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in order to coordinate joint actions in economic 
reforms and foster economic integration. Since 1994, Kazakhstan also cooperates with 
China in the framework of the Shanghai Forum. This regional political grouping also 
includes Russia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Its main purpose is to provide a platform for 
discussions on regional issues. 
The primary focus for CAU is oil and the routing of oil throughout the 
region. Kazakhstan is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of oil and gas 
reserves, but takes the lead in economic and security issues from Russia. The issue of 
pipeline routes is closely related with economic and security interests. While oil exports 
are key asset for Kazakhstan, all export pipelines are currently directed through Russia, 
including the new big pipeline from the Tengiz oilfields on the Caspian Sea to the Black 
Sea to the Russian port of Novorossiisk.  
The United States refers to these 12 CIS countries as the Newly (or New) 
Independent States (NIS). The US security strategy for the CIS is shouldered primarily 
through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which 
provides the United States with a venue for developing Europe's security architecture in a 
manner that complements its NATO strategy.  The United States relies on the OSCE to 
engage all the countries of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia in an effort to advance 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and to encourage them to support one 
another when instability, insecurity and human rights violations threaten peace in the 
region.408 US interest in the region stems from a desire for stability and tapping the great 
oil resources in the Caspian. Bringing those reserves to market involves stabilizing the 
region. Smith insists, “The primary focus [for the United States] will be damage control 
to prevent existing problems from escalating into crises that might engage Russia, China, 
                                                 
408 The White House, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” Office 
of the Press Secretary, January 5, 2000.  
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Iran, Pakistan, or India.”409  The focus must be on building democratic, free-market 
economies and developing infrastructure and pipelines.  
 
The United States is more concerned that the region does not become the 
breeding ground of civil war, nuclear proliferation, radical Islamic 
movements, a battleground for Asian geopolitics, an ecological wasteland, 
an economic basketcase or the target of a resurgent Russian imperial 
vision. The geopolitical centrality of Central Asia ¾ its spokes radiating 
out in all directions across a vital continent ¾  is of considerable 
importance.410 
 
The Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia defines the vision 
of the European Union for its partnership with Russia. The EU common strategy is 
adopted pursuant to Title V of the Treaty of the European Union and four principal 
objectives for integrating Russia into the European security architecture:  
 
(1) Consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions in 
Russia; (2) Integration of Russia into a common European economic and 
social space; (3) Cooperation to strengthen stability and security in Europe 












                                                 
409 Smith, Dianne L. Central Asia: A New Great Game? Strategic Studies 
Institute, Carlisle: Publications and Productions Office, June, 1996, p. 29.  
410 Ibid, p. 30. 
411 Schroeder, Gerhard, Common Strategy of the European Union of 4 June 1999 
on Russia, Official Journal of the European Communities, Cologne, June, 24, 1999, pp. L 
157/1-L 157/3. 
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Figure 1: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
 
 
b. Economic Competition 
 
Clearly, the European Union dominates the United States in terms of 
capital flows in and out of the CIS from its inception in 1991. The Russian Monetary 
crisis in August 1998 affected EU export and import capital flows, while the United 
States appeared unaffected due to less elasticity based on marketshare. In 1998, the 
United States actually gained the EU loss in import capital. Despite EU losses after 1998, 
Tables 10.1.1 and 10.2.1 show that the European Union dominates the CIS marketshare. 
The impact of the Russian crisis resulted in a 70% devaluation of the 
ruble, failure of several major Russian banks, governmental debt restructuring, and 
withholding of all IMF loans targeted for Russia (Table 10.3). The effects of the debt 






Table 10.1: Export Capital Flows in CIS 



















US 0 315 282.4 294.1 526.8 389.6 385.4 237
EU 1541 1616 1822 2256 2544 3038 2618 1812
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
 




Table 10.1.1: 1999 Marketshare of CIS Exports 









Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly 




Table 10.2: Import Capital Flows in CIS 
US AND EU IMPORTS FROM THE 


















US 0 170 535 394.5 372.7 417.4 563 570.8
EU 1989 1952 2415 2811 2821 2869 2560 2778
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
 




Table 10.2.1: 1999 Marketshare of CIS Imports 









Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly 





Table 10.3: IMF Loans to Russia, Jan. 1992 - June 30, 1999 in $US Billions 
 
Source: Constructed from IMF data. Foreign Policy in Focus, December 11, 2000. 
 
10. Middle East412 
 
a. Political Background and Security Architecture 
 
US leadership in the Middle East peace process has farreaching 
consequences for Arab willingness to work with the United States against Iraq and Libya, 
as well as its affects on European views towards American leadership.413 Schulzinger 
reports, “An incident involving Britain in the eastern Mediterranean in early 1947 
sparked a new approach to the Soviet Union. On February 21, the British government 
told the United States that it no longer would pay the upkeep on Greek and Turkish 
                                                 
412 The Middle Eastern countries include Yemen (1978), (After 1989) ¾ Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, Iraq (1997), and Iran 
(1997). 
413 Haass, p. 236. 
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efforts at fighting domestic leftist uprisings.”414 Although this circumstance may not 
have been surprising, American officials “did not mind their leaving the Middle East to 
the United States.”415 The events in Greece and Turkey presented a blessing to the United 
States: in accepting a $2 billion dollar loan, the “British had agreed that the currencies of 
their dominions would be fully convertible into dollars.”416 
After the 1967 war, Arab states decided that an oil embargo was a way to 
pressure the world and especially the United States to demand that Israel withdraw from 
the occupied territories. After studying the matter in 1967, however, the Arab League 
summit conference? abandoned the idea….Just after the 1973 war, however, the decision 
was reversed and Arab states used oil for the first time to achieve strategic objectives.”417 
 
Economic turbulence of the 1970s created incentives for the United States 
to be less supportive of European policy than it had been previously and 
tempted European governments to make arrangements with oil-producing 
states that were at odds with their traditional deference to US 
leadership.418  
 
At the Copenhagen summit in 1973, the OPEC nations offered to open a dialogue with 
the European Community, therefore, “the Europeans found themselves in a dilemma,” 
because the Middle East and Mediterranean were strategically important, politically and 
economically, but the Europeans wanted to avoid the appearance of giving in to Arab 
                                                 
414 Schulzinger, p. 207. 
415 Ibid, p. 207. 
416 Ibid, pp. 207, 208. 
417 Feldman, Shai and Abdullah Toukan, Bridging the Gap: A Future Security 
Architecture for the Middle East, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997. 
“Although the US government did not participate directly in oil production or trade, it 
was the most influential actor in the system [in the 1950s-60s]. The United States had 
moved decisively during and after World War II to ensure that US companies would 
continue to control Saudi Arabian oil (George, p. 140).”  
418 Hoffman, Stanley and Robert O. Keohane, The New European Community: 
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, p. 5. 
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pressure.419 Edwards avows, “Washington followed the development of EPC [European 
Political Cooperation] with great suspicion, particularly in those cases where it threatened 
to interfere with American interest and viewpoints.”420 
It is clear that the conflicts in the region have “fundamentally altered the 
economic structure of the region. States have been dissipating their national resources to 
buy weapons and build arms industries, thereby neglecting other sectors of their 
economies.”421 In response to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, 
and building on the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, particularly the Israeli-
Palestian Declaration of Principles and the subsequent Agreement on the Gaza and 
Jericho Area, and the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty of October 26, 1994, regional 
participants signed the Statement on Arms Control and Regional Security in Round 6 of 
the Arms Control & Regional Security Working Group in Doha, 1-5 May, 1994.422  
 
The Mitchell Report has highlighted the need for a freeze on Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza as one requirement for ending the 
current violent conflict and resuming peace talks. The Report calls for a 
settlement freeze as a confidence-building measure that would follow a 
cessation of violence by both Palestinians and Israeli forces in the West 







                                                 
419 Edwards, p. 58. 
420 Ibid, p. 58. 
421 Feldman, p. 71. 
422 Foundation for Middle East Peace, accessed at www.fmep.org/review.htm on 
June 21, 2001. 
423 Ibid.  
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b. Economic Competition 
 
The sharp decline for US and EU imports is certainly a function of the 
instability of the Middle Eastern region in 1978 and 1979 (Table 11.2).424 The increases 
in EU and US export and import capital flows from 1993 to 1998 may have resulted from 
the signing of the Statement on Arms Control and Regional Security in 1994, which 
provided stability for the region (Table 11.1). The relative demand for imports between 
the United States and European Union in 1993 may reflect the relative demand for oil by 
two relatively similar-sized populations (Table 11.2).425 Despite positive trends for the 
United States and the European Union in 1999, the European Union retains a 3 to 1 
advantage in Middle East export marketshare (Table 11.1.1) and a 3 to 2 advantage in 
import marketshare (Table 11.2.1). 
 
Table 11.1: Export Capital Flows in Middle East 















US 94 449.7 140.6 191.5 203.7 1091.3 1102.2
EU 592.8 1173.3 1174.9 730 895 3369 3134
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 1999
 
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistics of Foreign Trade, Monthly Bulletin, 
Vol. 12, multiple years. Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign 
Trade, Vol. 12, multiple years. 
                                                 
424 United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 (1978), accessed at 
http://www.palestine-un.org/peace/frindex.html on June 21, 2001. Appendix 3. 
425 World Bank, accessed at www.worldbank.org/data/ on June 21, 2001. The EU 
population figure for 1995 was 290 million, compared with the United States ¾ 264.8 
million. 
 127
Table 11.1.1: 1999 Marketshare of Middle East Exports 









Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, 





Table 11.2: Import Capital Flows in Middle East 
















US 34.07 420.7 112.6 171.5 165.1 1044.6 1291.4
EU 229.9 1756.6 1049.4 789 759 1752 1981
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 1999
 
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistics of Foreign Trade, Monthly Bulletin, 
Vol. 12, multiple years. Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign 
Trade, Vol. 12, multiple years. 
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Table 11.2.1: 1999 Marketshare of Middle East Imports 









Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, 
multiple years.  
 
11. Latin America and Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) 
 
a. Political Background and Security Architecture 
 
The economic and social development of Latin America since 1961 has 
been significantly influenced by external public financing.426 The General Secretariat 
acknowledged, “The external financing received by Latin America amounted to an 
annual average of nearly $750 million for the period 1961-67.”427 The United States 
contributed about $620 million as an annual average.  
The prospects for regional security demand that Latin American countries 
adopt prudent measures with a continental scope, in accordance with the Inter-American 
Defense System. The most promising prospects for Latin American security fall within 
the confines of the FTAA.  
                                                 
426 General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, “External 
Financing for Latin American Development,” Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971, p. 
203. 
427 Ibid, p. 204. 
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In the 1960s, the United States practiced a policy of regionalizing finance 
conditions and tying conditions to loan agreements.428 This practice is not uncommon 
today, with the IMF and the World Bank approving loans based on a number of 
principles, not the least of which align themselves with the Washington Consensus.429 It 
is important to note that the United States practiced regionalization of funding in the 
1960s. Regional integration in Latin America centered around the Central American 
Common Market. In 1960, the Latin American Free Trade Association was formed, but 
dissolved by 1969, losing several members to the ANDEAN group.430 Although the 
focus from regionalization “began to change in 1985-86 when Argentina and Brazil 
started to concentrate on the reduction of barriers to bilateral trade,”431 Latin America has 
a long history of market regionalization and for fostering economic security communities. 
In 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay formed MERCOSUR, the Common 
Market of the South. 432 In 1996, both Chile and Bolivia joined MERCOSUR. One study 
                                                 
428 Ibid, p. 213. 
429 Whitehead, Laurence ed., Democracy and the ‘Washington Consensus, World 
Development, Vol. 21, No. 8, 1993, p. 1329. 
430 McCormick, pp. 22, 23. The Andean Community is an economic and social 
integration organization with an international legal status. It comprises the following 
countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and the bodies and 
institutions of the Andean Integration System (SAI). Its early beginnings date back to 
1969, when a group of South American countries signed the Cartagena Agreement, also 
known as the Andean Pact. The purpose of the Agreement is to promote the balanced and 
harmonious development of the Member Countries; accelerate the growth of the Andean 
countries and the creation of jobs; facilitate participation in the regional integration 
process with the aim of gradually creating a Latin American common market; help 
reduce the external vulnerability of the Member Countries and improve their position in 
the international economic context; strengthen subregional solidarity and reduce the 
differences in development that exist among the Member Countries; and define social 
policies oriented toward improving the quality of life of different subregional groups and 
improving their access to the benefits of development.  
 
431 Ibid, p. 24. 
432 Lindert, p. 226. 
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reflects that the MERCOSUR “will increase real national incomes by 1 to 2 percent.”433 
Due to the success achieved by these Latin American countries and the experiences 
dealing with the US Bretton Woods regimes in the late 1970s and 1980s, “the Central 
American states wish to take their destiny into their own hands assisted by the 
EC/Twelve [today’s EU-15] to counterbalance the hegemonic presence of the United 
States.”434 MERCOSUR countries are greatly concerned with the prospects of loss in 
domestic monetary policy flexibility through dollarisation. 435 Despite the claim that Latin 
America’s future does not lie with the dollar, Francisca Gil Diaz, a prominent Mexican 
economist, argues that Mexico “would benefit from monetary union with the United 
States,”436 due to observations involving Mexico’s close link to the US economy through 
NAFTA. Following from the Mexican example, Latin America may benefit through 
dollarisation with the introduction of the FTAA. 
McCormick asserts, “The end of the colonial era in the 1950s coincided 
with the beginning of the process of European integration, so the relationship between 
Europe and its former colonies has been a key item on the agenda of integration almost 
from the beginning.”437 The European Union currently contributes about 3 percent of its 
budget in Developmental aid, adding to the much larger bilateral flows of aid from each 
of the member states.438  
 
 
                                                 
433 Ibid, p. 226. 
434 Edwards, p. 12. 
435 The Economist, January 6, 2001, p. 32. 
436 The Economist, “Divided about the Dollar,” January 6, 2001, p. 32. 
437 McCormick, p. 225. 
438 Ibid, p. 226. the European Union provides financial aid to 71 African, 
Caribbean and Pacific states ¾ the ACP states under the European Development Fund. 
Most EU aid goes to sub-Saharan Africa, but an increasing proportion is going to Latin 
America. 
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b. Economic Competition 
 
The trends in imports and exports for the MERCOSUR market are not 
sufficient to draw conclusions, rather, speculatively, the European Union’s continuance 
to increase ACP aid to Latin America could gain both build goodwill and trust with 
MERCOSUR countries (Tables 12.1 and 12.2). Tables 12.1.1 and 12.2.1 show that the 
European Union surpasses the United States in both export and import marketshare. A 
preponderance by Latin American countries to leverage the economic might of the 
European Union against the United States may be a trend that becomes the norm rather 
than a regional phenomenon.  
 
The dispute over bananas, for example, is often used as an indication of 
what happens to Lomé in the future. It shows that the concern of Latin 
American banana producers and American operators is more with the 
complex and discriminatory measures favouring EU and ACP producers 
and EU suppliers than with preferences themselves.439  
 
However, “the cross-subsidy received by EU suppliers for importing traditional ACP and  
EU bananas and the discrimination in regard to services is what concerns the USA and 







                                                 
439 Lomé Infokit, “EU-ACP Trade Provisions for ACP States: WTO 
Compatibility,” March 1997, accessed at www.oneworld.org/ecdpm/en/infokit/t6.htm, on 
June 21, 2001. 
440 Lomé Infokit. 
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Table 12.1: Export Capital Flows in MERCOSUR 














US 1931.7 1868.3 1599.5
EU 2203 2265 1893
1997 1998 1999
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 





Table 12.1.1: 1999 Marketshare of MERCOSUR Exports 








Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 






Table 12.2: Import Capital Flows in MERCOSUR 















US 1009.3 1055.3 1179.9
EU 1659 1737 1713
1997 1998 1999
 
Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 
12, multiple years.  
 
Table 12.2.1: 1999 Marketshare of MERCOSUR Imports 








Source: Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 
12, multiple years.  
 
E. EUROPE ¾  GLOBAL PROTAGONIST 
 
The European Union’s trending growth in economic influence after 1973, and, 
more specifically, following Maastricht, threatens to change the status of the new 
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economic world order and suggests the arrival of a new threat to US hegemony in the 
unipolar international system. Europe’s supranational experiment and the growing 
economic parity between the United States and the European Union threatens to have 
important consequences for the US-European security relationship.441  The current trend 
in US loss of global marketshare and general decline in economic strength is alarming 
(Table 13.1 and 13.2). Laurence Krause reports, “The United States has been losing 
shares of total world export markets for much of the last quarter century.” 442 Until 1973, 
the US economy was performing very well by its own historical standard, but the recent 
proliferation of democracies in Europe and the Asian Miracle has enabled potential rivals 
to US hegemony to surface.   
 
Table 13.1: Export Capital Flows in the Global Market 















WORLD 33239.9 71487 96324 164594 219533 334363
US 5942.83 11971.6 16711.5 26698.8 38738.2 56706.2
EU 17557.4 38212.8 47576.9 87999 120501 182106
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistics of Foreign Trade, Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 12, multiple 





                                                 
441 Cooper, et al, p. 20. 
442 Krause, Lawrence B. US Economic Policy toward the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations: Meeting the Japanese Challenge, District of Columbia: The Brookings 
Institution, 1982, p. 37. 
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Table 13.2: Import Capital Flows in the Global Market 















WORLD 34234.8 73886 100106 170642 219533 337835
US 5760.1 14440.9 21504 36773.5 48372.4 76157.1
EU 17935.9 38368.1 48990.1 89931 117319 174976
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Statistics of Foreign Trade, Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 12, multiple 
years. Organisation for Economic Co -operation and Development, Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, multiple years.  
 
The United States does not compete well with the European Union in any regional 
market reviewed, except the Asia-Pacific and ASEAN. Even in NAFTA, the European 
Union has successfully approached the US marketshare in imports and has just over a 
third of the US export share. In ASEAN, the United States holds a slight advantage over 
declining EU export capital, but the import capital marketshares run neck-in-neck. In all 
other regional markets, the European Union has a greater marketshare. However, the 
European Union usually retains more volatility in each market, which is shown when 
responding to political or economic change in each region. By comparison (Table 13.1.1 
and 13.2.1), regarding global export and import capital flows, the United States holds 
roughly one-third of EU exports (10%: 31%) and less than half of EU imports (14%: 
29%). It is becoming increasingly clear, Krause contends, “economic hegemony of the 
United States over the world economy has ended.”443  
 
In the past the United States has been active in initiating global 
international economic policies, but passive in responding to the policy 
actions of others. This position must now be reversed: the United States 
                                                 
443 Ibid, p. 66. 
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must exercise caution in initiating policy but be very active in adjusting its 




Table 13.1.1: 1999 Marketshare of Global Exports 










Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly 





Table 13.2.1: 1999 Marketshare of Global Imports 









Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Monthly 
Statistics of Foreign Trade, Vol. 12, multiple years. 
 
The European Union has made great inroads to third countries through its ACP 
aid program. The European Union has become the single biggest source of official 
development assistance in the world, contributing 45-50 percent of the total 
                                                 
444 Ibid, p. 67. 
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developmental aid in 1998, compared with the 20 percent provided by the United States 
and the 18 percent by Japan. 445  
 
Lomé IV included an attempt to push EU policy in a new direction by 
adding a structural adjustment element to ACP aid; that is, it now 
encourages economic diversification in the ACP states rather than simply 
providing project aid. This has made the EU more like the International 
Monetary Fund or the World Bank as a significant actor in international 
economic relations.446  
 
The building of goodwill will certainly reap dividends in regional markets in the 
future. The European Union must be careful, however, when tying political objectives to 
regional aid. As in the case with banana exports from former colonial holdings, the 
message for tying conditions to aid or cross-subsidies to imports is all too often lost. 
In addition to its considerable economic influence, the exercise of Europe’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy has added immeasurably to its prestige in the 
international political arena. From environmental to organizational expansion debates, in 
recent months the European Union has become more vocal and involved in playing a 
leadership role in international power politics. In March 2001, Sweden’s Foreign 
Minister Anna Lindh stated, “It’s becoming clear that the new US administration wants to 
take a more hard-line approach toward North Korea. That means that Europe must step in 
to help reduce tension between the two Koreas, not the least because the outside world is  
so worried about North Korean missiles.”447 In April 2001, the United States failed to 
achieve reelection to the UN Human Rights Commission for the first time since 1947, 
due in large part to French, Swedish, and Austrian exercise of their voting rights — 
sending a clear signal concerning European opposition to US practices of 
                                                 
445 McCormick, p. 226. 
446 Ibid, p. 228. 
447 Washington Post, “EU Seeks to Fill US Role in Koreas,” March 25, 2001 
accessed at http://ebird.dtic.mil/Mar2001/e20010326euseeks.htm on March 26, 2001. 
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unilateralism.448 In June 2001, Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson challenged US 
resolve to forego the Kyoto Protocol.449 On the eve of the summit conference in June 
2001 with Vladimir Putin, in Warsaw, President George W. Bush invited former Soviet 
controlled countries to join the European Union, as well as an expanded NATO.450 In 
Göteburg, the European Union reaffirmed plans to expand membership in 2004, despite 
European annoyance at Bush’s bequest for such expansion. Candidate countries for the 
first wave of expansion include Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Cyprus 
and Estonia.451 The European Union has been instrumental in the entry into the WTO by 
China in recent months, but China’s membership agreement has caused strife between the 
United States and European Union concerning life insurance companies and shares of 
Chinese ownership.452 Cooper contended, “A more unified EC would become a more 
powerful economic adversary of the United States, complicating the search for 
international consensus and leading to less stable international economic and financial 
arrangements.”453 This reality has come and, with it, another truth — a more unified 
Europe has hampered the US role in the international political arena.  
The future role of the European Union as a key political contender for US 
hegemony in the international system has already been eclipsed by the reality of EU 
contention for global marketshare of capital flows, but the political reality is coming to 
fruition. The entry into the global arena of power politics by the European Union is clear. 
                                                 
448 Time.com, “UN Defeat Was a Message from Washington’s Allies,” May 7, 
2001, accessed at www.time.com/time/world/printout/0,8816,108730,00.html on May 7, 
2001. 
449 The Washington Post, “Bush Clashes with EU Leaders,” June 15, 2001. 
450 Hutcheson, Ron, President Promotes a Larger EU, Knight Ridder 
Newspapers, June 16, 2001. 
451 Greimel, Hans, Protesters Rally at Economic Summit, Associated Press, July 
2, 2001. 
452 Koppel, Naomi, China Ready for WTO, Associated Press, July 5, 2001. 
453 Cooper, et al, p. 20. 
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In order to preclude further erosion to US prestige in the international community — both 
economically and politically — the United States must look closely at its transatlantic 












































Though overt hostility between the European Union and the United States does 
not seem likely, and one certainly does not anticipate that the consequences of 
mercantilist regionalism would extend to overt hostilities among the blocs, “relations 
could well turn harsh as conceptions of security diverge, security coordination dwindles, 
and economic bonds loosen.”454 Security and the desire to assure autonomy might 
reemerge as an issue in the relations among the great powers. This assertion is certain to 
manifest itself along economic lines and regional security structures. In this way, the 
United States must abolish its tendencies towards provincialism, unilateralism, and, to 
some extent, bilateralism. Richard Haass suggests, “The great issue of American foreign 
policy today is the contradiction between the persisting desire to remain the premier 
global power and an ever deepening aversion to bear the costs of this position.”455 In 
view of the successful achievement of the US pursuit for the democratic peace, the 
United States should refocus its efforts to building, rather than maintaining, its prestige in 
all power arenas — economic, political, and social. Recommendations for dealing with 
the European Union’s hegemony contention should include a strategy for dealing with the 
European Union in its most basic form — a trade bloc — and then in its more 
internationally accepted form — an incrementally growing, supranational, politcal 
structure — the EU polity. The differences are, in most aspects, mutually exclusive, 
though not in all cases. 
 
 
                                                 
454 Sandholtz, et al, p. 168. 
455 Haass, Richard N. ed. Transatlantic Tensions: The United States, Europe, and 
Problem Countries, District of Columbia: Brookings Institution Press, 1999, p. 7. 
 142
B. DEALING WITH THE EU TRADE BLOC 
 
As a trade bloc, the European Union has proven to be very successful, especially 
since 1973 with the onset of the WTO’s Tokyo Round of negotiations. The 1973-1979 
Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations were characterized by realism, regarding 
the US and EC competition for ascendancy over the WTO regime.456 Realist competition 
continues to characterize US-EU relations within the WTO. Following a US-EU meeting 
at the WTO in Geneva on June 25, 2001, Peter Carl, the European Commission’s general 
director for trade, and Deputy US Trade Representative, Peter Allgeier, announced the 
launch of a new “ambitious” round of trade negotiations at the upcoming ministerial in 
Doha, Qatar.  
 
Allgeier spoke of a ‘growing convergence between us [the United States 
and the EU] on issues of principle, on issues of organization, of substance 
and process’. We also see eye-to-eye with respect to certain basic 
principles such as the need for a balanced agenda for the inclusion of 
issues which are of sufficient interests to all members of the WTO.457 
 
This acquiesence by Allgeier suggests US acceptance of EU parity of prestige within the 
WTO. A recent acquiesence by the European Union to allow the United States more time 
to comply with WTO anti-dumping laws suggests that the European Union may have 
attained ascendancy over the United States already. “EU Trade Commissioner Pascal 
Lamy said, ‘I note with satisfaction that the United States intends to comply fully with 
the WTO rulings — and in this context, we are ready to give them a little more time if 
                                                 
456 Grieco, Joseph M. Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique 
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, International Organizations, Vol. 42, No. 3, 
Summer, 1988, p. 3. 
457 Trade Directorate-General of the European Commission, “EU and US Have 
as a Common Objective the Launch of a New ‘Ambitious’ Trade Round,” Reference 
118200, received by email June 27, 2001. 
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that is needed to resolve this question’.”458 The ascendancy of the EU position is further 
supported by the July 1st US decision to suspend the increased customs duties imposed on 
EU imports since the 1999 banana dispute.459 Since the implementation of the 1994 
WTO Agreement, which provided the European Union with the equivalent votes-to-
members (15), the ascendancy of EU prestige within the WTO has been without question.  
Together with the EU gain of prestige within the IMF (an organization housed within the 
UN System), the control of international monetary regimes has shifted toward an EU 
advantage regarding international monetary policy. 
Rather than calling for “more countries in Europe,”460 the present administration 
should seek to enter into regional security structures and economic organizations on a 
multilateral basis, fostering experience and leadership when asked and assistance and 
know-how when needed. The reality of Europe is one of a regional trade bloc, which 
effectively functions as just that — a bloc, precluding economic entry and preserving 
European economic interests. The European Union may be a collective of democratic 
countries, but the collective first pursues its own economic — and now political — 
interests and then the democratic interests of the global community. Adding more 
countries to an already economically superior and competent trade bloc organization will 
only preclude the future development of US economic interests inside democratically 
developing, free market oriented countries. “By the end of 1999, the EU-15 direct 
investment in the United States amounted to $624.8 billion — 63 percent of total foreign 
direct investments in the United States. Similarly, US direct investment in EU-15 
                                                 
458 Trade Directorate-General of the European Commission, “EU Agrees to 
Allow US More Time to Comply with WTO Ruling on Anti-Dumping Law,” Reference 
118200, received by email July 25, 2001. 
459 Trade Directorate-General of the European Commission, “EU Welcomes 
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118200, received by email July 2, 2001. 
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amounted to $512.1 billion.”461 By all acounts, the EU trade bloc has very effectively 
precluded US access to the EEA, Central and Eastern Europe, and CIS regional 
marketshares of capital flows. Further expansion of EU roles will only further preclude 
US access to these regional markets and effectively reduce US prestige, while bolstering 
EU marketshare and, consequently, political clout. This turn of events stipulates the firm 
potential for transatlantic friction in a number of arenas. 
 
1. Economic Arena 
 
The current trend in international economic policy within the WTO, IMF, and 
World Bank is managed multilateralism, but a realist examination of economic 
competition between state actors — the United States and the European Union (an 
economically-empowered supranational state actor) — reflect regional rivalry. The 
incongruencies between the approach by state actors and international monetary regimes 
leads to friction within the international economic order. The pursuit of regional rivalries 
could ultimately lead to the entrenchment of state actors into regional autonomy. The 
forging of the European Union itself can be construed as an attempt to diminish the 
interdependence of the European community nations on the US economy. The US trend 
from autarky to NAFTA to FTAA also depicts a trend toward regional autonomy. 
Clearly, managed multilateralism is the least provocative and most promising venue for 
continuing international economic development without leading to aggression from 
spillover into sociopolitical avenues. With this in mind, the United States should seek to 
redefine foreign and domestic fiscal policy, as well as the development of regional 
security architectures along the lines of managed multilateralism.  
The recent EU investigation of the merger of General Electric and Honeywell has 
shed light on the reality that Europe can clearly reach into US domestic econo-politics, 
because of the interdependence in the US-EU aviation arena. With the threat of such 
                                                 
461 Europe, accessed at www.eurunion.org/partner/usstates/usstates.htm on June 
15, 2001. 
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action, the “potential for transatlantic friction in defense procurement is considerable.”462 
Therefore, the United States should establish trends to take into account transatlantic 
defense procurement, including procurement of US defense technology, further 
refinement of IMF and World Bank lending procedures to support developing nations, 
redefining US trade interest to preclude expansion of the European trade bloc, rather, the 
establishment of US bilateral ties with developing Eastern European and Central Asian 
countries. 
 
2. Political Arena 
 
The London Report of 1981, which predicted that third countries would express 
greater interaction with the European Community as European Political Cooperation 
intensifies and broadens has proved to be correct.463 Edwards suggests, “Political 
dialogue with regional groupings are special cases in this general framework.”464 Pascal 
Lamy stated that the consolidation of Mercosur will give Brazil and its partners in the 
regional grouping more political weight in international negotiations, lending weight to 
the prediction that the European Union would become an effective political actor with 
international regional groupings.465 With EU adoption of a strategy to promote core labor 
standards and social governance globally, the Union threatens to overtake the US 
historical leadership in the WTO by presenting the strategy at the next round of WTO 
negotiations in Qatar in November 2001.466 
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In 1975, the European Community undertook region-to-region political dialogue 
with the Group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (ACP), an organization of 
initially 66, now 71, states with which the European Union provides financial aid through 
the European Development Fund.467 The European trend of success with negotiating 
inter-regional cooperation between the Union and regional economic organizations 
continued in November 1978 with ASEAN. Mr. Genscher, then the Federal German 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking as President-in-office of the European Community 
and the European Political Cooperation (EPC) at the General Assembly of the United 
Nations in 1978 stated, 
 
This Europe of the Nine wants to be a centre of cooperation in the world, 
and it sees itself on the side of those who seek to create an order for that 
cooperation founded on equality and partnership….The European 
Community is founded on respect for the equality of all its members and 
on the principle of joint decision making. On the strength of these qualities 
and principles it can serve as an example for a global order giving all 
states, big and small, the same right and the same opportunity to play a 
part in the shaping of their common future. It can also serve as an example 
of the countries of a region forming an association and combining their 
efforts so as to accomplish the task at hand and to strengthen the 
independence, the political stability and the economic growth of a region. 
We are glad to see that the idea of regional association among states with 
equal rights is gaining ground in all parts of the world and we support this 
trend.468 
 
In 1984, the European Community continued their tradition of political dialogue 
with the Contadora Group in seeking a political solution to the Central American Crisis 
stemming from civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador.469 In February 1988, the 
European Community extended this tradition to the “Rio Group,” enabling the 
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participants to informally discuss Latin America’s economic crisis and the problem of 
foreign debts.470 
Group-to-group dialogue has proven a very successful venue for the European 
Union in implementing a European foreign policy. 471 The United States must develop a 
tradition of multilateralism in order to compete with the European Union’s successful 
venue of group-to-group dialogue. In order to achieve a successful dialogue with regional 
economic associations, it will be important to supersede the turn-of-the-century charter of 
the United States Information Agency (USIA), affirmed by President Clinton: 
 
To promote the national interest and national security of the United States 
of America through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign 
publics, and to broaden dialog between American citizens and institutions, 
and their counterparts abroad.472 
 
It is necessary to deepen the dialogue and to pursue a stance, which presupposes to our 
would-be politico-economic partners that the United States does not hold a monopoly 
over knowledge. The United States could deepen and broaden its relations with regional 
economic organizations by courting a policy of multilateralism, rather than traditional 
bilateralism. 
 
3. Social Arena 
 
For more than three hundred years, the Americans and Europe have shared, to 
some extent, socio-cultural foundations. During the twentieth century, the United States 
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and European nations have fought together to decide the outcomes of two world wars and 
participated in the largest coalition in history, Desert Shield/Storm. NATO has, to date, 
been extremely helpful in keeping open and active the lines of political dialogue between 
the United States and its European partners, but falls short in supporting economic and 
social issues. Rather, the UN has long been the forum for environmental and 
humanitarian issues, as well as eeking out international solutions to the incongruencies 
between domestic and international politics of nation states. 
Fundamentally, the United States and the European Union have different attitudes 
toward the role of the state and market intervention, which leads to distinct policy 
approaches towards two core domestic economic tenets — agriculture and steel 
production. 473 Because complex interdependence is so prevalent, this incongruency often 
creates problems for the United States and the European Union regarding bilateral 
economic and trade relations. The emergence of regional security regimes suggests that 
group identification is becoming the norm, rather than the exception. The United States 
and Europe are distinct in many ways, but the foremost social distinction is found in 
terms of identity and, as a result, domestic politics. 
 
C. DEALING WITH THE EU POLITY 
 
From an economic perspective, the United States and the European Union are 
hurdling toward economic parity. From a political perspective, the European Union is 
lurching forward in the international system with an air of confidence, because it is a 
more or less unified polity exercising almost fifty years of cooperative experience. The 
United States, on the other hand, has exercised 225 years of bilateralism, a political 
stance which is quickly losing legitimacy in the international system today. The level of 
convergence of the European polity far exceeds the level that the United States will ever 
allow itself within NAFTA or the FTAA. Because the United States acts as a single 
entity, it will never have the experience of group-to-group political cooperation, which 
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the European Union is afforded by its very nature.  In order to sustain its current level of 
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VII. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
 
A. REVISITING THE TOPIC 
 
Since the consummation of the international system after 1648, the evolution of 
Europe has been unceasing. Following WWII and the implementation of a number of US-
led regimes to reconstruct the international landscape, albeit in favor of US hegemony, 
Europe has emerged as an economic contender for US hegemony in the unipolar 
international system in the post-Cold War era. 
 
B. REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
In the conduct of this research, this thesis has answered several questions, in order 
to recognize the rise of the European Union as a contender for US marketshare and 
political influence in regional world markets and to suggest implications for revising US 
foreign policy to respond to declining US influence in those world markets: 
1. How has the evolution of the European community of nation-states posed a 
new threat to US hegemony? 
Since 1973, the decline of US hegemony in the international system has been 
hyphenated by the undeniable ascendancy of the European Community as an economic, 
and more recently, since Maastricht, a political polity. The politico-economic polity of the 
European Union threatens US hegemonic contention with regard to economic marketshare 
and political prestige within regional world markets and their accompanying security 
architectures. This circumstance threatens to reduce US prestige and influence within the 
international system. 
2. How has the evolution of US domestic and foreign policy contributed to the 
weakening of US hegemony in the post-Cold War era? 
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Although the United States established a number of the economic and political 
regimes following WWII, which reshaped and propped up war-ravaged Europe, the 
United States has lost its leadership role in many of the regimes since 1973 and moreso 
since 1989.  The Third World movement and the liberal use of voting privilege by third 
countries in the post-Cold War era has led to a weakening in US prestige within the UN, 
as well as European countries. Although the Western powers were clearly the victors in 
the Cold War, the sheer magnitude of their success brought to mind the question of the 
future necessity of the European defensive alliance — NATO. More importantly, the push 
by the United States to have the European Union include all of the newly independent 
countries of eastern Europe in its membership has precluded the United States from 
developing a sense of urgency in cultivating US-favored, bilateral and multilateral ties 
with those countries, including solid economic and political ties. This is threatening to 
become most apparent in Central Asia, where civil unrest will certainly threaten US-led 
counterterrorism efforts.   
3. Has US-EU economic competition in regional world markets led to the 
development of competition within regional security architectures?  
Without question, economic issues are tied to regional security architectures. The 
European Union has made great inroads to third countries through its very effective ACP 
aid program. The EU tactic of group-to-group cooperation in both economic and political 
arenas is a clear source of competition to the US bilateral style of trade and politics. By 
almost every account, with the exception of the Asia-Pacific and ASEAN, the European 
Union supersedes US marketshare. With the European Union’s successful assumption of 
import and export marketshares in NAFTA, the European Union has successfully 
threatened to assume ascendancy within the US-led security architecture, thereby 
compelling the United States to pursue the FTAA to block further encroachment and to 
maintain marketshare. This will certainly become a trend in other regional markets as the 
European Union gains economic and political prestige through enlargement and 
engagement. 
4. What are the implications for US economic and foreign policy for the post-
Cold War era? 
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Put simply, the United States must continue to pursue a policy of managed 
multilateralism, rather than regional rivalry with the European Union. Although, in order 
to do so effectively, the United States must develop a new multilateral paradigm — one 
that will successfully compete with EU group-to-group cooperative management style. 
The United States must continue to pursue leadership roles within  internationally-focused 
regimes, without taking its leadership role for granted.  Likewise, the United States can no 
longer afford to be regarded as a reluctant sheriff,474 rather, as the United States is 
currently doing with regard to its leadership role in the war against terrorism, the United 
States must continue to seek out those roles, which it is uniquely qualified to fulfill. 
Whether it be an alliance, a coalition, or a posse, the United States must assert its 
leadership within a multilateral context and court the leadership of regional security 
structures in order to strike a firm balance between US interest and regional security 
needs. This is the policy that the United States must pursue to ensure continued US 
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